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ACADEMIC ABSTRACT 
 
In my first essay, I demonstrate how the Cremers and Petajisto (2009) Active 
Share measure can be re-parameterized into the standard portfolio parameters we 
typically see in other portfolio management studies, namely betas and standard 
deviations.  This demonstrates that Active Share is not very different than the measures 
we traditionally use to study portfolio management.  One of the parameters that results 
from the re-parameterization is a measure of the risk of the manager’s active bets, the 
volatility of the implied hedge position relative to the benchmark.   This parameter is 
equally as strong as Active Share in predicting excess performance and helps give a 
better economic understanding of why Active Share exhibits predictive power.  Active 
Share and this implied hedge measure are like a confidence and information problem.   
In my second essay, I use the idea of benchmark relative investment optimization 
as outlined in Roll (1992).  These portfolios are sub-optimal but they can be better than 
the alternative, i.e. better than the portfolios that the principals could build themselves.  I 
outline the conditions under which delegated managers increase the principal’s utility.  
Additionally, if implemented properly, tracking error constraints, Jorion (2003) and beta 
constraints, Roll (1992), can force the delegated manager to buy a more efficient 
portfolio than the benchmark.  Thus, even though relative utility maximization is sub-
optimal, if the delegated manager is more skillful than the principal in portfolio 
construction, delegated portfolio management is still likely preferred to naively holding 
the benchmark.  
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CHAPTER 1. DISSERTATION SUMMARY 
 
I. Introduction 
Delegated portfolio management is an extremely broad topic.  The fundamental 
idea in studying delegated portfolio management is to study the effects of allocating 
decisions in a manner that separates the portfolio decision-making from the beneficiary’s 
interests.  Most delegated portfolio management literature is concentrated in the broad 
classification of investments research but also central to this idea is the inherent 
principal/agent relationship created by the delegation.  The principal/agent connection 
gives a lot of the research in delegated portfolio management a link to research in 
corporate finance and in particular corporate governance, incentives, contracting, and 
control.  Obviously, the contracts and incentives can both directly and indirectly cause 
the delegated manager to behave in a manner not completely consistent with that of the 
principal.   
A large portion of this research is focused on a relatively narrow definition of 
delegation.  For example the CIO of an investment operation like a pension or 
endowment can hire an external manager to manage all or part of the assets.  This more 
narrow definition is usually referred to as decentralized investment management or 
multistage investment management in the literature.  An exceptionally large amount of 
the money in the financial markets is managed in this way.  This is particularly evident 
when you consider that the entire investment company universe, which includes both 
open end and closed end mutual funds, is explicitly defined in this manner.  Less obvious 
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but just as vast a universe of investment managers is the directed or institutional 
investment management business, which for all intents and purposes is essentially the 
same as a mutual fund relationship albeit designed for more sophisticated investors 
(pension funds, endowments, etc.).  With a looser definition, the private wealth 
management business could be grouped into this category as well.     
Although a large portion of the money in the financial markets is managed in this 
manner, taking a much more nuanced definition of delegated portfolio management 
opens it up to an even much larger universe of implicit and explicit contracts in 
investment decision-making.  For example, any time a separation exists between the final 
beneficiary and the individual making an investment decision, the agent has the potential 
to make decisions that are not completely in the best interests of the principal, even if the 
agent’s intentions are in the principal’s best interests.  In this context, there is also a 
separation between portfolio manager and an analyst on the same investment portfolio.  
There is even a separation between an internal, non-delegated, manager, where all of the 
investment decision-making is done in house, and the beneficiaries of the funds, as in the 
case of an endowment.  It is evident that close to all investment decisions could be 
classified as delegated decisions if you sufficiently loosen the definition. 
Given that this topic spans the universe of financial research from Investment 
Theory, Linear Asset Pricing, Portfolio Management, Economics, Corporate Governance, 
etc., the aspect of this field I have chosen to study is delegated manager portfolio choice 
given the incentive problem.  That is, I am studying some of the metrics and parameters 
we use to choose between different delegated managers, whether those metrics are useful, 
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and how to improve the relationship through controls and constraints.  In order for 
delegation to be efficient, we must believe that external managers can improve upon the 
portfolio that a principal could build himself without the delegation, otherwise we would 
not rationally delegate.  The standard decision-making tool is some form of model or 
parameter that gives us an indication of whether the delegated manager can outperform 
some benchmark, implicit or explicit, pre-specified or not.     
My first essay builds on a metric introduced into the academic literature by 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009).  This paper has been fairly well cited in top academic 
journals since its publication.  Their primary finding is that their measure, Active Share, 
is predictive of future relative performance.  This finding drives their main conclusion 
that Active Share’s predictive power supports the existence of skill in active 
management.  It is a small step to conclude that this measure could perhaps be used to 
predict which managers have the ability to outperform a benchmark.  In my first essay, I 
decompose this measure into two, multiplicative components and show Active Share’s 
relationship to more traditional portfolio risk metrics.  Additionally, this measure is not 
independent of systematic risk but the level of systematic risk inherent in the measure 
does not seem to bias the predictive power.  Therefore, the conclusion of whether this 
measure is actually representative of manager skill is in question.  It could very well be 
just a reflection of something more fundamental, something already known. 
My second essay builds on a long line of portfolio management research that is 
based on Markowitz (1952).  I study the optimality of the relative performance incentive 
on portfolio efficiency for the principal in Markowitz’s mean/variance space.  The 
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relative performance incentive is a structural assumption that defines how a delegated 
manager behaves and is not necessarily consistent with the behavior of the principal.  
Many academics have tried to tackle the problem of whether this type of delegation can 
be efficient with the first true challenge to the problem coming from Sharpe (1981).  
Since then, under differing sets of assumptions, the problem has both asserted efficiency, 
and also proven non-efficiency depending on the specific assumptions.  I approach the 
problem differently than many of my predecessors by using the relative performance 
incentive and Roll (1992) mean-tracking error volatility space, and my results indicate 
that although increasing efficiency is largely uncertain, constraints to tracking error and 
beta can improve efficiency and in certain cases replicate any portfolio that the principal 
would like the agent to build on his behalf. 
The balance of this introduction proceeds as follows.  Section II describes essay 1 
and the general process I use to decompose Active Share into its component parts.  This 
exposes the relationship between Active Share and tracking error (and thus systematic 
risk).  Section III describes essay 2 and the utility problem and primary economic 
assumptions used to model the relative investment incentive in the space of absolute 
mean-variance space.  Finally, Section IV describes the prospect of publishing in 
portfolio management and in particular extensions of these ideas.  There seems to be a 
good amount of very interesting future research in the field of delegated portfolio 
management and there are direct extensions of the research in this dissertation to keep me 
busy for a number of years to come. 
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II. Essay 1 - Active Share and Tracking Error 
The concept of Active Share was introduced to the academic literature in Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009).  This measure represents the portion of a portfolio that deviates 
from its benchmark and is measured in terms of the weight differences of the holdings 
between the portfolio and the benchmark.  It can be expressed as follows: 
 Active Share = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 = 12��𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�,𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
(1) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 and 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖 represent the weights of asset i in the portfolio and the benchmark 
respectively.  Active Share is predictive of future excess performance.  Portfolios with 
higher active share tend to outperform their benchmarks and active portfolios with lower 
active share tend to underperform.  This evidence is used to support the conclusion that 
some active managers have skill.  Active Share is introduced as a measure of the risk of 
active management and placed in direct contrast to Tracking Error Volatility.   
Tracking Error Volatility is a long established tool used in evaluating active 
managers and can be used as both an implicit and explicit risk constraint controlling the 
behavior of active managers.  It is usually defined as follows: 
 Tracking Error = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 = 𝜎𝜎�𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡�, (2) 
where 𝜎𝜎(… ) is the standard deviation function and 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 represent the returns in 
time t of the portfolio and the benchmark respectively.  Evidence on the implementation 
of Tracking Error as a risk tool in active management can be found in Roll (1992), 
Grinold and Kahn (1999), Jorion (2003), and many additional sources.  According to 
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Cremers and Petajisto (2009), tracking error alone does not produce the same predictive 
effects as Active Share. 
 In this essay, my primary contribution is in building the functional relationship 
between the concepts of Active Share and Tracking Error.  The reconciling term is the 
standard deviation of the hedge portfolio whose weights, 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑖𝑖, are defined as follows:      
 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖1
2
∑ �𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖−𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 =  𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 . (3) 
The hedge portfolio h, with weights 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑖𝑖, has a very important economic interpretation.  
Both the long side and the short side of this portfolio have weights that sum to 1, thus 
both the long and short exposures in this sense are investable.  Also, it is the portfolio that 
the investment manager would buy to differentiate from the benchmark index.  Active 
Share is just the weight that the manager invests in this hedge portfolio.   
 Using the above construction for portfolio h, I can show that the reconciling factor 
between Active Share and Tracking Error is the standard deviation of this hedge 
portfolio, 𝜎𝜎ℎ.  That is: 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝜎𝜎ℎ = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝. (4) 
This expression represents a decomposition of Tracking Error, the risky deviations a 
portfolio makes from its benchmark, as a product of the volatility of the hedge portfolio, 
essentially the risk of the delegated manager’s information, and the Active Share, the 
weight (or confidence) the delegated manager applies to his/her information.  
 Given that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 is not predictive of either future relative or absolute return, and 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 is predictive, an important distinction can be made about whether it is actually 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 
directly creating the pricing effect, 𝜎𝜎ℎ directly creating the pricing effect and it showing 
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up indirectly in 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝, or a combination of both.  It seems illogical that merely deviating 
from one’s benchmark by generating Active Share should create value, but as a proxy for 
confidence perhaps it does.  However, there must be some information that Active Share 
is capturing to create value.  That information is encapsulated in the hedge portfolio thus 
the direct skill of an active manager should be primarily attributable to this information.  
In this context, Active Share is only a secondary identifier or a proxy for the actual 
information.  Therefore, the purpose of this essay is two-fold: 
1. To expose Active Share’s functional relationship to Tracking Error  
2. To determine whether the predictive power of Active Share in encompassed 
by the level of Active Share or by the risk in the hedge portfolio. 
 
III. Essay 2 - Tracking Error Volatility Optimization 
 The concept of benchmark relative risk, usually expressed as tracking error, is 
almost as old as Modern Portfolio Theory itself.  In a world dominated by Delegated 
Portfolio Management, oftentimes the primary incentive that separates the agents from 
the principals is the agent’s reliance on an implicit or explicit relative performance 
incentive.  If the principal already holds, or has the ability to manage, his optimal 
portfolio, then delegation of the portfolio management responsibilities should not happen.  
This is because any additional constraint imposed by the principal/agent relationship will 
necessarily create a portfolio that is at maximum of equal preference.  Therefore, the first 
assumption that needs to be made in a delegated portfolio management relationship is 
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whether there exists a portfolio with higher utility than the one the principal can build 
himself.      
 Let p represent the best portfolio the principal can build, a the portfolio that the 
agent builds, and m the optimal portfolio given the principal’s utility.  If U(…) is the 
utility function of the principal then we know: 
 𝑈𝑈(𝑝𝑝) < 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚), and 𝑈𝑈(𝑎𝑎) ≤ 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚). (5) 
However for the delegation to be rational, we have to also expect that: 
 𝑇𝑇[𝑈𝑈(𝑎𝑎)] >  𝑇𝑇[𝑈𝑈(𝑝𝑝)]. (6) 
It is unfortunately not always the case that 𝑈𝑈(𝑎𝑎) >  𝑈𝑈(𝑝𝑝).  In fact, the more risk averse 
the principal, the less likely it is that the agent will actually increase utility.  Additionally, 
the more efficient the principle’s original portfolio, the less likely it is that the agent will 
increase utility.   
These propositions become particularly apparent when we consider a standard 
utility relationship where preference is increasing in returns and decreasing in risk.  If we 
frame this problem in the context of mean-variance portfolio optimization, the standard 
procedure is to maximize utility given the satisfaction of a set of parametric equations 
that define the efficient boundary, or the envelope, upon which lies portfolio m.  
However, the relative performance incentive encourages the external manager to 
optimize over relative returns rather than absolute returns which has the consequence of 
the agent also considering risk measures in relative risk rather than absolute risk.      
As a simple example, we can analyze the effects of the agent optimizing a 
quadratic utility function over the standard deviation of relative returns, the tracking error 
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volatility, rather than the typical constraint of optimizing over the standard deviation of 
absolute returns.  The choice this type of decision-making leads the agent to buy a 
portfolio that has a higher expected return than the portfolio that the agent would manage 
themselves, a, but at the same time a higher standard deviation of absolute returns.  This 
leaves the agent’s resulting portfolio in the ambiguous space where it is the structure of 
the utility function, at particular the relative levels of risk aversion, which determines 
whether the agent did indeed increase utility for the principal.   
The balance of this essay explores the Roll (1992) TEV (Tracking Error 
Volatility) space and its theoretical implications of the relative performance incentive 
with a particular interest in how it affects optimal utility when translated back to mean-
variance space.  Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to address the following: 
1. Show how the Agent’s utility function generates the TEV frontier. 
2. Demonstrate how relative decision-making, albeit inefficient, could lead to 
portfolios preferred by the principal. 
3. Provide support for the constraints to tracking error and beta and show how 
these constraints can assure utility improvements.   
There are five main contributions of this essay to the academic literature on 
portfolio management. The first contribution of this essay is in analytically connecting 
the Roll (1992) TEV frontier to the delegated utility optimization problem.   I 
demonstrate, with quadratic utility, how the optimization process in relative returns 
causes the delegated managers to invest on the TEV frontier.  In fact, the TEV frontier is 
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the critical path delegated managers optimize upon given changes to their risk aversion 
levels.  
  The second contribution comes in calculating the optimal Beta and TEV 
constraints based on the definitions of these constraints in the Roll (1992) and Jorion 
(2003).  I demonstrate that if the agent's opportunity set can be estimated then a utility 
optimizing principal can assign a TEV or a Beta constraint to not only assure utility 
improvement but also maximize his utility given the agent's incentives. 
  The third contribution comes in connecting the Roll (1992) Beta constraint and 
the Jorion (2003) TEV constraint.  The combination of these two constraints and my 
setup for the agent's optimization process yields a unique solution in mean-variance 
space.  I show that if a principal can estimate the agent's opportunity set then he can 
assign a Beta/TEV constraint combination that produces any portfolio in mean-variance 
space.  Essentially, the principal can force the agent to optimize the principal's utility 
instead of the agent's utility, removing all of the inefficiency of the delegated incentive. 
  The Fourth contribution is in demonstrating the connection between constraining 
on agent risk aversion and constraining on TEV.  Many authors that solve delegated 
portfolio management problems rely on the knowledge of and ability to constrain agent 
risk aversion.  However, this parameter is rather illusive and a criticism of this literature 
is abundant.  We just cannot reliably estimate agent risk aversion.  TEV on the other hand 
is measurable and directly observable, at least ex-post.  I show that a principal 
constraining an agent on TEV causes the agent to choose a portfolio equivalent to one he 
would have chosen if he had been constrained on agent risk aversion. 
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  Lastly, I discuss, rather arbitrarily, how even if the agent's opportunity set is 
unknown, mild constraints to Beta and TEV still likely lead to utility improvements for 
the principal.  This lends support to the anecdotal proposition that these constraints are 
popular and wildly used in the investment industry.  This paper extends a relatively 
scarce set of literature but a highly important topic in portfolio management and in 
particular delegated portfolio management.  Given the prevalence of delegated 
contracting in the investment industry, and that these contracts can create some rather 
drastic agency problems, the ability of principals to reduce their risks and costs is very 
important. 
 
IV. Summary and Extensions 
 In recent years, portfolio management research has only been mildly popular in 
the top finance journals.  Every year there are usually a handful of very good articles, 
probably on the order of 10, published in these journals.  Personally, I find this topic area 
fascinating and enjoy reconciling the models we use in portfolio management with many 
of the other topics we study in finance.  In fact, most of the successful portfolio 
management literature being published today ties portfolio management together with 
other interesting and usually more popular topic areas in the broader finance literature.  
The two essays in this dissertation are just two of those ideas.  Below I have outlined 
some other connections that are worth studying that have only been mildly covered.  
These are broad ideas and each has multiple extensions built in. 
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First, if it is true that managers can be shown to have skill then this may imply 
that Active Share be evidence of the pricing of “idiosyncratic risk.”  Although this is 
often taken with a fair amount of skepticism, such as in Bali et. al. (2005), the existence 
of excess return pricing in a broad market factor model would be strong support.  My 
suspicion is that if excess return is priced on the idiosyncratic factor in my model, is it 
merely because the benchmark is inefficient and the idiosyncratic factor is picking up real 
systematic exposure to the true market portfolio.  Active Share could help disentangle 
some of these factors and allow us to get a cleaner look at systematic vs. non-systematic 
risk.     
The fundamental law of active management, Grinold and Kahn (2000), says that 
the information ratio is related to the productivity of the information, IC, and the square 
root of the number of bets.  The information ratio is the excess return over the tracking 
error and tracking error is active share times the risk of the hedge.  This makes the slope 
of the models in Active Share comparable to the fundamental law of active management.  
This connection could be studied either by considering it as manager skill, as both 
Cremers and Petajisto and Grinold and Kahn consider it, or by exploring the systematic 
exposure of both measures. 
Since active share is akin to the portion of the portfolio in which you deviate from 
the index, we can consider this portion scalable.  Essentially, we can buy more and sell 
more of the hedge to further lever the position and create more active share.  Why did the 
manager stop where he or she stopped?  Why not lever further?  In reality the implied 
long only constraint would prevent this but theoretically the hedge could expand.  In this 
12 
 
context, the active share number is really a confidence number in the information the 
manager had about the hedge portfolio.  Since the risk of the hedge is the risk of the 
manager’s information, and the active share is the confidence in that information, active 
share can be considered in concert with the risk of the hedge as a confidence and 
information problem.  This is related to Grinold and Kahn (2000) as well. 
The problem of active share and appropriate levels of active share begs the 
connection with agency and fund governance.  This has been studied from the corporate 
side in papers such as Ferris and Yan (2009), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), 
and Dybvig, Farnsworth, and Carpenter (2010).  The framework of relative risk, and in 
particular measures of active share and tracking error, are ripe with metrics that can be 
used to measure the cost of agency, the level of interest misalignments, or the 
benefits/detriments of delegated management and monitoring.  These metrics are mostly 
unknown and unstudied in the realm of governance and connecting the worlds of 
corporate governance and delegated portfolio management through the analysis of 
relative portfolio pricing metrics can provide a rich stream of research. 
 Substituting the decomposition of Tracking Error into the Active Share 
decomposition yields an equation for Active Share that clearly shows Active Share is 
dependent upon portfolio beta: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 = 1𝜎𝜎ℎ ��𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 − 1�2𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2�1 2⁄  (7) 
This equation decomposes Active Share into its component Systematic and Idiosyncratic 
exposures.  Although 𝜎𝜎ℎ is also dependent on 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝, for the moment I will ignore that 
dependence.  Solving for 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 yields the following: 
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𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 = 1 ± ��𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝜎𝜎ℎ�2 − 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 �1 2⁄ . (8) 
Alternative methods to estimate portfolio beta typically involve using a long time series 
of historical data as in the market model estimation from above or simultaneously 
estimating 𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛 + 1) 2⁄  covariances and applying the same weight vector used to 
calculate the Active Share, 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏, to imply a long historical time series.  The benefit 
of calculating beta using this method is that the Active Share is a stock variable, and the 
only historical data needed is used to estimate three variances, a parameter that can be 
estimated with relative accuracy even in the presence of non-stationary historical data.  
This method suggests that a beta calculated in this way might be able to provide 
information for pricing that is more difficult to estimate when using more standard 
measurement techniques. 
The potential for this the agent TEV optimization constraint to alter aggregate 
equilibrium in the financial markets is possible and could be explored and conditions for 
this constraint to not affect the equilibrium could be outlined.  This could potentially be 
an explanation for the seemingly inexplicable amount of momentum in cross-sectional, 
asset pricing regressions.  Perhaps the aggregate, macroeconomic equilibrium movement 
can be traced to better take advantage of momentum, something that is very difficult to 
build a viable investment strategy around. 
 The second essay studies the problem of portfolio delegation from the perspective 
of a single principal hiring a single delegated agent.  This problem can be and has been 
extended in other research to include a more realistic multi-delegated-manager scenario.  
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The constraints I apply to assure utility improvements have different implications in a 
multi manager scenario but could still be used to assure both utility improvement and 
global optimality.  Additionally, another constraint has to be employed in the multi-
manager scenario to prevent systematic factor cannibalization between external 
managers.   
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CHAPTER 2. ACTIVE SHARE AND THE IMPLIED HEDGE 
 
I. Introduction 
Active portfolio management is a hotly debated and controversial topic.  The 
research is both supportive and critical of a portfolio manager’s ability to “beat an index” 
and significant effort has been made by academics and practitioners alike to both prove 
and disprove the idea of skill in active management.  The evidence supporting skill in 
active management is not particularly robust.  In the aggregate, investment managers 
must underperform their respective benchmarks by their transactions costs and 
management expenses.1  With few exceptions, it is generally accepted that there is no 
magic formula to achieve excess performance through active management.  Nonetheless, 
a large amount of money is managed by professional investment managers on behalf of 
clients, and the evidence strongly suggests that the external investment manager’s 
primary goal is outperformance of a specified benchmark2, whether that goal is explicit 
or implicit.   
 A recent measure, Active Share, introduced into the academic literature in 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009), provides evidence that there is indeed skill in active 
management.  This measure is essentially the percent of the holdings in a portfolio that 
differentiates from the holdings or constituents of a benchmark.  It is calculated as 
follows: 
1 Sharpe (1991) and French (2008) strongly assert this viewpoint. 
2 See Treynor and Black (1973) for an early discussion of this.  
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 Active Share = 12��𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
, (1) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 and 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖 are the portfolio or constituent weights of asset i in the portfolio or 
the benchmark respectively, and n is the number of securities held.  Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) finds that Active Share is predictive of excess returns and that there is a positive 
relationship.  That is, portfolio managers that take more Active Share tend to outperform 
their benchmarks by more than managers that have low Active Share.  This result is 
confirmed through the post 2008 financial crisis period in Petajisto (2013). 
 As a measure of benchmark relative decision-making or risk, Active Share is 
compared and contrasted to tracking error volatility, which has become the favored 
measure of active risk over the last 20 or so years.  Tracking error is the standard 
deviation of difference in returns between a portfolio and its benchmark.  This measure 
can be contrasted with the standard deviation of the raw or absolute returns as in the 
sense of Markowitz (1952), which has long been the standard to measure total portfolio 
risk.  Roll (1992) does an analysts of tracking error volatility in mean-variance space 
under the assumption that the tracking error volatility frontier is the efficient set upon 
which delegated managers will optimize.  Further evidence that tracking error is 
considered the standard measure of portfolio manager risk can be found in other works 
such as Jorion (2003), Alexander and Baptisa (2010) and Bertrand (2010), which analyze 
allocation decisions in the style of modern portfolio theory with constraints to relative 
benchmarking and tracking error volatility.  There is also an interesting extension of the 
Modigliani and Modigliani (1997) M-2 measure in which Muralidhar (2000) uses 
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tracking error volatility to expand the M-2 measure into M-3 for the purpose of justifying 
risk-adjusted performance.   
When attempting to find a metric to measure skill in the aggregate or of the 
average investment portfolio, an unbiased statistic of the aggregate skill must net to 
zero3.  In the case of metrics that do seem to predict performance, it is important to 
identify the source of the opposing, counterbalancing effect.  As in the case of portfolio 
beta, the portfolios with beta greater than one are balanced by the portfolios with beta less 
than one.  Essentially, the market cap weighted sum of all portfolio betas should sum to 
one.  When we find factors that are priced, whether that be in absolute or in relative 
performance, and they are not the standard risk factors that we are typically accustomed 
to analyzing, we should approach those factors critically until a determination can be 
made about exactly what we are looking at. 
 If we consider the portfolio weights and a covariance matrix of stocks, the 
tracking error4 can be calculated as follows: 
 Tracking Error = ����𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
�𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑗𝑗�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗, (2) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 is the standard deviation of returns from security i, and 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the correlation 
between security i and security j.  Tracking error’s connection with Active Share is 
3 This is an application of Sharpe’s (1991) arithmetic of active management. 
4 By tracking error I technically mean tracking error volatility.  Other authors follow 
Grinold and Kahn (1999) in defining tracking error as the root mean square of the 
difference in returns.  My definition is the standard deviation of the difference in returns.  
However, it is common practice to just refer to tracking error volatility as tracking error. 
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immediately detectable since both measures are a function of �𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�.  However, 
even given the relationship between tracking error and Active Share, Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009) finds that whereas Active Share is predictive of relative returns, tracking 
error is not.  At least the evidence is exceedingly weak when compared with the strong 
evidence for Active Share.  Therefore, there is something significant about the difference 
between these two measures that is causing the effect.  In fact, there is a simple, 
functional relationship between these two metrics such that: 
 Active Share × 𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻 = Tracking Error. (3) 
I will derive and define 𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻 in Section 3 of this essay, but this measure is essentially an 
investible, “market neutral” hedge portfolio, 100% long and 100% short, that reflects the 
active bets of the portfolio manager, and it can be calculated as follows: 
 
𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻 = � 2∑ �𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ���𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑗𝑗�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 
(4) 
 A graphical example of the formation of this hedge portfolio can be seen in Figure 
1.  In this figure, the active portfolio and the benchmark portfolio weight vectors are 
shown using bar graphs on the left of the figure and as you work across the figure from 
left to right the relative portfolio is formed and then normalized to create the hedge 
portfolio weight vector. 
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 Cremers and Petajisto (2009) actually use a different measure of tracking error 
that assumes the benchmark relative systematic risk, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝, of every portfolio is equal to 1.  
This measure of tracking error is more popularly thought of as the standard deviation of 
the error term in a linear regression between the portfolio and the benchmark, 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀.  The 
tracking error definition from above has a parameterization that illustrates this 
phenomenon well: 
 Tracking Error𝑝𝑝 = ��𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 − 1�2𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2. (5) 
It is obvious from this formula that as 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 goes to 1, the tracking error goes to 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀.   In the 
context of the difference in weights vector, �𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�, 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 can be written as follows: 
 
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 = ����𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
�𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑗𝑗�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗. (6) 
Thus the similarity between Active Share and 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 is also apparent.  𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 is simply the 
tracking error where the benchmark weights are scaled by 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝.  It is important to note that 
Active Share and Beta are not independent of each other.  As beta deviates from 1, Active 
Share increases.  However, this phenomenon was controlled for in Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) and examined in this essay as well and the level of systematic risk does not seem 
to affect Active Share’s predictive ability.  Essentially, Active Share is not biased by the 
systematic risk of 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝.   However, the existence of this 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 possibly makes tracking error 
volatility, as opposed to the error regression volatility , a more appropriate measure for 
comparison. 
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In this paper, I derive a representation for Active Share that connects it 
theoretically to tracking error volatility.  This re-parameterization suggests that it is 
essentially an adjusted tracking error, adjusted by 𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻.  Active Share and 𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻 are just 
reflections of each other around tracking error, a very popular measure of relative risk in 
delegated portfolio management.  Active Share’s predictive power seems at least partially 
related to the information already contained within tracking error.  In particular, some of 
Active Share’s pricing effect is necessarily attributable to the implied hedge volatility, 
𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻.  However, a substantial and economically significant part of Active Share is still 
unaccounted for in the hedge volatility and would typically still be considered 
representative of manager skill.  The significance of both parameters, 𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻 and Active 
Share, gives a better picture of how individual portfolio managers obtain and use both 
benchmark differentiation, i.e. deviations in weights to generate excess return, and the 
potential for taking advantage of their specific information.   
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II includes a review of the 
relevant research and outlines the contribution of this project.  Section III is a detailed, 
constructive derivation of the re-parameterization into standard portfolio parameters and 
a decomposition of Active Share into its component systematic and non-systematic parts.  
Section IV is a description of the data used.  Section V describes the empirical methods 
and outlines the results of tests used to assert consistency of the model presented in 
Section III.  Section VI discusses extensions and concludes the paper.   
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II. Background and Contribution 
The history of benchmark relative measures of risk is almost as old as modern 
portfolio theory.  This is evident in two particular ratios related to tracking error and 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀.  
Both are reminiscent of the Sharpe Ratio, which is originally introduced in Sharpe (1966) 
but revisited in Sharpe (1994).  Rather than representing raw returns over standard 
deviations, the newer measures are indicative of relative performance over relative risk.  
The first of which is commonly referred to as the information ratio and is the benchmark 
excess return over the tracking error volatility: 
 Information Ratio = 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝
, (7) 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 is the tracking error volatility of the portfolio.  This ratio is merely a Sharpe-
style ratio for relative returns since the tracking error is just the standard deviation of 
relative returns or benchmark excess returns.  It is difficult to determine who coined the 
term “information ratio”, but a good description of this ratio is found in Grinold and 
Kahn (1999). 
The second of these two ratios, the Appraisal Ratio, is similar to the Information 
Ratio but is oftentimes confused with it.  Considering the regression of a portfolio’s 
returns on its benchmark, the Appraisal Ratio is the Jensen’s Alpha, which is the intercept 
term from a regression of the portfolio on its benchmark and is described in Jensen 
(1968), divided by the standard deviation of the regression error: 
 Appraisal Ratio = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀
, (8) 
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where 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 is Jensen’s Alpha.  Compared to the Information Ratio, the Appraisal Ratio has 
the benefit of not being biased by the presence of benchmark relative systematic risk, or 
beta.  Both, however, are examples of early relative risk measures in in context of 
portfolio theory.  Other definitions of the appraisal ratio have been used in the past (in 
fact the original definition was very different) but this one encompasses the modern 
usage of this term.   
Active Share in particular, as well as tracking error, are highly related to the 
mathematical notion of a p-norms.  Essentially, Active Share is the 1-norm or the 
“length” of the difference in weight vector, �𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�, divided by 2.  A 2-norm 
calculation would provide the true length of the vector in two dimensional space and the 
squared difference terms make the formula look much more like a variance or standard 
deviation (or more importantly a tracking error) albeit without the covariance matrix5:  
�𝐰𝐰𝐩𝐩 − 𝐰𝐰𝐛𝐛�2 = ���𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�2𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
. (9) 
This measure is very similar to one devised by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) 
called the Industry Concentration Index and is similar to a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index: 
 Industry Concentration Index = ��𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�2𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
. (10) 
This measure differs in that, other than the obvious lack of the square root, the counter on 
the sum is a counter for the industry rather than the security.  Cremers and Petajisto 
5 Actually, this measure is equivalent to a standard deviation measure when covariance 
matrix equal to the identity matrix. 
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(2009) compare the analysis of this measure to that of Active Share, and to a measure of 
Active Share calculated on the industry level rather than the security level, and find that it 
is just as significant in pricing regressions however when included together, Active Share 
tends to dominate.  When they analyze the squared calculation at the security level, they 
find no significance whatsoever.  Using a sample of Australian firms however, Brand, 
Brown, and Gallagher (2005) calculate this exact measure and call it the divergence 
index.  They find that their divergence index predicts fund performance. 
 Another interesting permutation of Active Share was analyzed in Jiang, Verbeek, 
and Wang (2011), which creates a cross-sectional average of the relative weights on 
individual securities.  They call their measure Deviations from Benchmark or DFB and it 
is defined as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ��𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝=1
/𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, (11) 
where 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is the number of funds that hold security i.  In this context, the authors are 
trying to measure the average distance a typical fund differentiates from the benchmark 
rather than the specific amount any particular fund differentiates.  Their measure, 
obviously related to Active Share, also produces positive pricing effects thus is 
potentially also a candidate to support the idea of manager skill.  With their measure they 
also find that this skill is particularly evident around earnings announcements. 
 Although the examples above look a lot like Active Share, there is a whole other 
classification of measures that tries to reveal similar information.  Kacperczyk, Sialm, 
and Zheng (2008) measure what they call the return gap.  This is the return difference 
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between a portfolio comprised of the point in time holdings extrapolated forward and the 
actual returns the portfolio experienced, presumably due to changes in the underlying 
holdings since the report date of the holdings.  This return gap is important and used in 
Puckett and Yan (2011).  They find that these interim portfolio changes seem to be what 
drives manager outperformance, not end-of-period holdings.   
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) use a fund’s R2, generated using a multifactor 
regression analysis, as a measure of selectivity and assert that lower R2 significantly 
predicts better performance.  Low R2 is similar in this manner to high Active Share in 
that it allows for greater manager selectivity and control of the portfolio, i.e. less reliance 
on the benchmark.  In fact, the authors contrast their measure of selectivity to Active 
Share and imply strongly that they both measure the same information.  Given the 
relative difficulty of obtaining all of the relevant information required to calculate Active 
Share on a large sample of mutual funds, and the relative ease in obtaining, for example, 
return data, R2 produces just as strong results with less effort.  Active Share and R2 are 
mechanically and functionally related and their connection is due to their relationships to 
both tracking error and the implied hedge volatility.  In another active management skill 
story, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) show that managers who are sensitive to public 
information (RPI) are less likely to outperform.  Their RPI measure is simply an R2 
measure that attempts to identify benchmark differentiation. 
  Many authors advocate for a method of portfolio construction that emphasizes 
dependence on relative performance, both in risk and return, simply because optimization 
in that space removes the obligation that risk aversion in absolute space be considered.  
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However, risk aversion in relative space is still essential.  For evidence of this see Becker 
et. al. (1999) and Grinold and Kahn (2000).  A good example of how this is developed 
can also be found in Stutzer (2004).  It also suggests how we can avoid paradoxes such as 
Roll’s critique, Roll (1977).  However, anecdotes of this analysis can be found in many 
highly cited financial papers such as Gompers and Metrik (2001), Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2002a,b), Berk and Green (2004), and Cetin (2006).  Even very recent papers provide 
conclusions based on the assumption of consistency of the relative performance 
optimization.  Examples of these are Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) and Li and Tiwari (2009), 
which further suggests that principals are supportive of this relative optimization in their 
deliberate alignment of incentive contracts with the solutions to a relative optimization 
problem.  
  However, the real problem with relative measures of risk, such as tracking error, 
regression error variance, and Active Share, is that the traditional systematic priced risk 
factors are either symmetric around the horizontal axis6, or explicitly eliminated from the 
measure.  Essentially, increases in a traditional systematic factor, such as beta, above the 
beta of the relative index are equally offset by decreases.  A beta of 1.5 will produce the 
same level of relative risk as a beta of 0.5.  An outline of this phenomenon can be found 
in Jorion (2003) and is hinted at in Roll (1992).  Pricing models with measures of relative 
risk can be thought of as agnostic to the regular systematic factors.  Therefore, if pricing 
is found on relative risk factors, we can be assured that the pricing is not attributable to 
systematic factors, assuming the relative risk factor is not biased in systematic risk.      
6 See Figure 2 for a simple demonstration of this with Active Share. 
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  The first contribution of this essay is in connecting Active Share mathematically 
to these other methods through a simple manipulation of the active bets a manager takes.  
In this manner, Active Share is really just a different way to look at the information we 
have always used when considering and analyzing problems in relative portfolio 
management.  Through this relationship, the standard metrics we have used to measure 
relative or delegated portfolio management throughout time are intimately connected to 
Active Share all through the measure I call the volatility of the hedge.  This measure, 
derived constructively in the next section and gives hints at the economic interpretation 
of Active Share and measures like it.   
 When attributing tracking error into the product of the volatility of the hedge and 
Active Share, Active Share unambiguously becomes the parameter associated with a 
manager’s confidence level in the information implied by the manager’s active hedge 
against the benchmark.  Active Share’s predictive effects are thus consistent with the idea 
of manager skill.  But on the other side of the coin, the implied hedge volatility also 
contains information about manager skill. It is the risk of the manager’s information.  In 
this context, it is just another form of attribution.  It is an attribution of manager 
confidence and information risk.  In this context, it can be connected to literature in risk 
aversion and signal precision, such as in Admati et. al. (1986). 
 
III. A Constructive Decomposition of Active Share 
Active Share, as introduced to the academic literature in Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009), is an intuitive and simple metric for evaluating benchmark deviation.  In the 
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context that it is introduced, it is by definition the percent of the fund’s holdings that 
deviate from the benchmark.    However, it comes in a difficult and unfamiliar functional 
form.  Active Share is defined as: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 = 12��𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
= 12 �𝐰𝐰𝐩𝐩 − 𝐰𝐰𝐛𝐛�𝟏𝟏 (12) 
𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 and 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖 are the portfolio weights of asset i in the fund and in the benchmark.  
�𝐰𝐰𝐩𝐩 − 𝐰𝐰𝐛𝐛�𝟏𝟏 is the 1-norm of the difference in the weight vectors and is simply another 
notation for the absolute value of the summation over i.  Although this calculation is 
simple and intuitive, it is difficult to visualize in the context of how we typically study 
portfolio theory and construction.  Namely, it would be more convenient if we could see 
what Active Share looks like parameterized using more standard portfolio math 
parameters, standard deviation, correlation, beta, etc.   
 The key to the re-parameterization is in the intuition behind the original equation.  
If we consider the benchmark as the base position and make a 100% investment into the 
benchmark, Active Share is the percent invested into each of a long and short portfolio 
that make up the hedge portfolio used to reweight the benchmark to that of the fund in 
question.  Thus, I prove the following statement:   
 
III.A Theorem: TE = AS × σH  
Tracking error volatility is the product of Active Share and the volatility of a 
100% long, 100% short hedge fund (the volatility of the implied hedge).  Essentially, TE 
= AS × σH when: 
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TE = [(wp – wb)′ Ω (wp – wb)]½ 
AS = ½ ∑ | wp,i – wb,i | = ½|| wp – wb || 
σH = [wH′ Ω wH]½ 
Proof:   
Suppose wp and wb represent the n × 1 weight vectors for portfolio p and 
benchmark b respectively such that wp ≠ wb and: 
 wp′1 = 1   and   wb′1 = 1  (t.1) 
Consider the following difference-in-weights vector, xH: 
 xH = wp – wb (t.2) 
Note that by (t.1) and (t.2) we have: 
 xH′1 = (wp – wb)′1 = wp′1 – wb′1 = 1 – 1 = 0 (t.3) 
Therefore, xH is a zero weight hedge portfolio.  Define two new vectors xL and xS so that 
xH is split into its long and short exposures: 
 Let xL = xH when xH > 0 otherwise xL = 0. 
Let xS = – xH when xH < 0 otherwise xS = 0. 
xH = xL – xS 
(t.4) 
(t.5) 
(t.6) 
By (t.3) and (t.6) we have: 
 xH′1 = (xL – xS)′1 = xL′1 – xS′1 = 0 (t.7) 
Thus by (t.7) we have: 
 xL′1 = xS′1 (t.8) 
The lengths of each side of the hedge portfolio, xH, are equal.  Define two new vectors 
wL and wS by normalizing xL and xS as follows: 
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 wL = (xL′1)-1 xL  
wS = (xS′1)-1 xS  
(t.9) 
(t.10) 
Note that both wL and wS sum to 1: 
 wL′1 = (xL′1)-1 xL′1 = 1 
wS′1 = (xS′1)-1 xS′1 = 1 
wL′1 = wS′1 
(t.11) 
(t.12) 
(t.13) 
Both portfolio L and portfolio S are 100% weight vectors and hypothetically investable.  
Additionally, their weights are also equal.  Next, combine these vectors to create portfolio 
H: 
 wH = wL – wS (t.14) 
By (t.11), (t.12), and (t.14):  
 wH′1 = (wL – wS) ′1 = wL′1 – wS′1 = 1 – 1 = 0 (t.15) 
Thus by (t.13) and (t.15), portfolio H is a zero weight hedge portfolio where the long and 
short side of the hedge are both weighted to 100%, i.e. it is a 100% long, 100% short 
hedge portfolio.  From (t.6), (t.9), (t.10), (t.13), and (t.14), the following can be shown:  
 xH = xL – xS = (xL′1)wL + (xS′1)wS = (xL′1)( wL – wS) = (xL′1)wH (t.16) 
Since xL and xS are strictly non-negative the expressions (xL′1) and (xS′1) can be restated 
in terms of a 1-norm, defined as || x || = ∑ | xi |: 
 (xL′1) = || xL || 
(xS′1) = || xS || 
(t.17) 
(t.18) 
Again from (t.6), (t.17), and (t.18), if I take the 1-norm length of xH, the following is true: 
 || xH || = || xL – xS || = || xL || + || xS || = 2 (xL′1) (t.19) 
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And from (t.16) and (t.19), the scalar that relates xH to wH becomes apparent.  It is just 
one half of the 1-norm length of xH: 
 xH = ½|| xH || wH (t.20) 
However, one half the 1-norm length of xH is just the Cremers and Petajisto (2009) 
Active Share, AS.  From (t.2) and the definition of the 1-norm: 
 ½|| xH || = ½|| wp – wb || = ½ ∑ | wp,i – wb,i | = AS (t.21) 
From (t.2), (t.20) and (t.21), the relationship between the portfolio weight vector, wp, the 
benchmark weight vector, wb, and the implied hedge weight vector, wH, is as follows: 
 wp – wb = xH = ½|| xH || wH = AS × wH (t.22) 
Applying the portfolio variance function, where Ω is the n × n covariance matrix, to the 
relationship in (t.22) it can be shown that: 
 wp – wb = AS × wH 
(wp – wb)′ Ω (wp – wb) = AS2 × wH′ Ω wH 
[(wp – wb)′ Ω (wp – wb)]½ = AS × [wH′ Ω wH]½ 
 
 
(t.23) 
And, by the definitions provided in the statement of the theorem, (t.23) shows that 
tracking error volatility is the product of Active Share and the volatility of a 100% long, 
100% short hedge fund (the volatility of the implied hedge).  Essentially: 
 TE = AS × σH □           (t.24) 
III.B Extensions of the identity 
Stated another way, the active share is equal to the fund’s tracking error divided 
by the standard deviation of the risk of the implied hedge position. 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻  (13) 
This expression leads to a very interesting decomposition of active share into its 
systematic and idiosyncratic components.  Consider first the regression of rb on rf in the 
standard market model:  
 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖 (14) 
A popular expression for tracking error is formulated using the parameters from 
the above regression expression: 
 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝2 = �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝�2𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 (15) 
In this context, tracking error is decomposed into its systematic and non-
systematic components.  Similarly, due to the relationship between tracking error and 
active share, this decomposition can be used to express active share as a combination of 
systematic and non-systematic components. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝
2 = �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝�2 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻2 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻2 (16) 
Given the functional relationship above, it is obvious that deviations in active 
share (active share greater than zero) are generated by both systematic deviations 
(benchmark relative) and non-systematic deviations from the benchmark index.  
Therefore, analysis of the uses of active share as a risk measure for pricing purposes must 
recognize that part of the deviation is due to systematic risk. 
Before talking about relative return, we have to provide a framework to in which 
to study it in the same manner as we did for risk above.  Since we rely on the market 
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model in the previous section to parameterize active share, this follow-up is appropriate.  
Therefore, consider the market model for fund p: 
 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 (17) 
We define excess return as the return of the portfolio minus the benchmark and adjusting 
the market model appropriately yields the following relationship: 
 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + (𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 − 1)𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 (18) 
 Represented in this specification, on the left, is the excess return.  On the right are 
𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝, the return attributable to idiosyncratic risk, and (𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 − 1)𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏, the return attributable to 
systematic risk.  Figure 2 illustrates this decomposition on a graph. 
 
Figure 2 
Graphical Decomposition of Active Share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows graphically how active share is decomposed and attributed between systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk.  Active Share is on the horizontal axis and Excess return in on the vertical axis.  The 
dotted line represents systematic deviations in benchmark relative beta and the solid line an example of the 
deviations of an example mutual fund.  It is evident that if a fund deviates from its benchmark exposure 
either by increasing or decreasing benchmark beta, large deviations in active share are possible. 
𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝  , (𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 − 1)𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏  �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝�2 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2𝜎𝜎ℎ2  
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IV. Data 
Following Cremers and Petajisto (2009), I use the universe of mutual funds for 
this study. Given the number of products available and the percentage of the total market 
capitalization managed in these portfolios, it is clear that the market is mostly comprised 
and therefore probably also driven by delegated managers, like mutual funds.  According 
to the Investment Company Institute7, as of December 2011 there were $12,968 billion 
invested in 16,506 registered investment companies.  The scope and breadth of external 
management strongly suggests that these externally managed portfolios make up a 
substantial, representative sample of the market.  Therefore, when attempting to analyze 
market pricing phenomena, it seems appropriate to use the cross section of mutual funds 
as a representative sample for the population of delegated investment managers.  
However, the sample if necessarily incomplete as hedge funds, pension funds, trusts, and 
separate accounts are also not trivial.  But, it should be representative.   
This paper relies on five major data sources, CRSP, Thomson Reuters, Petajisto, 
Compustat, and Morningstar.  First, return data on the set of mutual funds is required and 
obtained from CRSP.  When data on mutual fund holdings are needed, I use Thomson 
Reuters although this information is also available in CRSP.  The primary reason to use 
the holdings of mutual funds is to calculate Active Share.  However, I have defaulted to 
using the Active Share calculations already provided by Antti Petajisto on his website8 
because the list is relatively comprehensive.  This also follows other studies that have 
7 http://www.icifactbook.org/ 
8 http://www.petajisto.net/data.html 
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used the Active Share measure in research, e.g. Amihud and Goyenko (2013).  Another 
essential source of data used to calculate Active Share is index constituency.  Access to 
the S&P index constituents is available in Compustat.  To the extent possible, Active 
Shares were recalculated independently and confirmed for the three major S&P indices.  
The lack of availability for the remainder of the index constituencies is not a concern.  
Lastly, I use Morningstar to obtain index returns for all of the indices in the dataset.   
 To begin constructing the dataset, I started with the list of funds and statement 
dates provided by Petajisto on his website.  This list is then matched to CRSP and 
Compustat to obtain fund characteristics, returns, and risk parameters.  The list is 
matched with Morningstar to obtain index returns.  From the combined Morningstar and 
CRSP data, the relative risk parameters can be calculated.  After matching and 
calculating all of the relevant parameters, the data is filtered.  I first remove all funds that 
identify as an index fund or as an enhanced index fund.  The purpose of this study is to 
test active management and these funds by definition do not qualify.  Next, I filter out, 
somewhat arbitrarily, funds that have exceptionally strange characteristics.  Essentially 
this includes removing large outliers that look like incorrectly measured observations.  
Lastly, I filter out all funds that have Active Shares < 5%, or annualized tracking errors < 
0.1%, to account for closet indexers.  The final sample yields 61,857 fund-time 
observations.  The number of observations by time is summarized before the filter in 
Table A1.  All filters together, including removing self-identified index funds, reduced 
the dataset from an original matched 73,317 observations.         
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The final dataset is summarized in Table 1.  This table includes the summary 
statistics for all 61,857 observations in the dataset with active share statement dates 
ranging from 12/31/1990 through 09/30/2009.  The top two entries, activeshare_min and 
trackingerror_min, are the values as reported on Antti Petajisto's website at 
www.petajisto.net.  The remainder of the data points come in the following format: 
##mxPAR 
The number before each calculation, ##, represents the number of months, m, over which 
the calculation is made.  The x is stands for the time period of the calculation and equals 
either p, a, or c.  It signifies that the calculation is made either ex-ante, ex-post, or 
centered on the Active Share statement date.  The final PAR is the parameter under 
consideration.   
Beta is the portfolio’s benchmark relative beta,  
TE is the benchmark relative tracking error volatility,  
SE is the standard deviation of the regression error from market model regression, 
SB is the standard deviation of the benchmark, 
SP is the standard deviation of the Portfolio, 
SH is the standard deviation of the 100% long/short benchmark relative hedge, 
BAA is the benchmark adjusted alpha, 
ER is the excess return measured PR – BR, 
PR is the portfolio return, and 
BR is the benchmark return.     
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard
Deviation 5th % 25th % 50th % 75th % 95th %
activeshare_min 0.7804 0.1529 0.4960 0.6770 0.8090 0.9100 0.9680
trackingerror_min 0.0661 0.0423 0.0221 0.0385 0.0558 0.0809 0.1464
12maBeta 0.9697 0.2298 0.6248 0.8447 0.9626 1.0804 1.3407
12maTE 0.0612 0.0435 0.0188 0.0334 0.0499 0.0750 0.1425
12maSE 0.0525 0.0355 0.0167 0.0293 0.0435 0.0646 0.1182
12maSB 0.1516 0.0731 0.0636 0.0925 0.1392 0.1915 0.3069
12maSP 0.1577 0.0803 0.0662 0.0993 0.1399 0.1942 0.3126
12maSH 0.0774 0.0509 0.0294 0.0452 0.0635 0.0931 0.1721
12mpBeta 0.9703 0.2240 0.6324 0.8498 0.9642 1.0767 1.3321
12mpTE 0.0601 0.0428 0.0185 0.0328 0.0490 0.0737 0.1393
12mpSE 0.0516 0.0351 0.0164 0.0288 0.0426 0.0635 0.1168
12mpSB 0.1551 0.0744 0.0654 0.0934 0.1430 0.1969 0.3136
12mpSP 0.1607 0.0806 0.0668 0.1010 0.1439 0.1995 0.3152
12mpSH 0.0758 0.0494 0.0293 0.0447 0.0624 0.0909 0.1675
6mpBeta 0.9721 0.2898 0.5514 0.8212 0.9596 1.1018 1.4357
6mpTE 0.0551 0.0428 0.0146 0.0281 0.0439 0.0680 0.1334
6mpSE 0.0438 0.0336 0.0113 0.0224 0.0351 0.0548 0.1051
6mpSB 0.1418 0.0755 0.0558 0.0868 0.1237 0.1744 0.3092
6mpSP 0.1468 0.0824 0.0549 0.0902 0.1271 0.1793 0.3112
6mpSH 0.0694 0.0497 0.0224 0.0385 0.0564 0.0844 0.1595
12maBAA 0.18% 10.27% -13.90% -4.43% -0.27% 4.08% 15.16%
12maER 0.01% 10.86% -14.19% -4.92% -0.67% 3.75% 15.89%
12maBR 7.52% 21.18% -32.29% -4.68% 10.86% 21.13% 38.75%
12maPR 7.53% 23.02% -33.54% -4.77% 9.92% 20.39% 40.86%
1mpER -0.12% 2.26% -3.59% -1.15% -0.11% 0.91% 3.32%
1mpBR 0.61% 5.46% -8.37% -2.45% 1.16% 4.06% 8.37%
1mpPR 0.49% 5.66% -8.91% -2.57% 0.94% 3.91% 8.72%
3mpER -0.07% 4.17% -6.15% -1.96% -0.18% 1.66% 6.23%
3mpBR 1.92% 10.20% -17.41% -3.14% 2.77% 7.49% 17.58%
3mpPR 1.85% 10.80% -17.78% -3.40% 2.51% 7.85% 18.14%
6mpBAA -0.03% 6.46% -9.54% -2.95% -0.11% 2.76% 9.42%
6mpER -0.15% 6.36% -9.07% -3.02% -0.37% 2.35% 9.20%
6mpBR 3.99% 14.75% -26.93% -3.48% 5.97% 11.94% 25.45%
6mpPR 3.84% 15.71% -26.78% -3.78% 5.59% 12.22% 26.30%
12mpBAA -0.02% 9.62% -13.36% -4.43% -0.40% 3.79% 14.04%
12mpER -0.33% 10.18% -14.14% -4.96% -0.83% 3.43% 14.52%
12mpBR 7.99% 22.02% -34.28% -5.38% 11.04% 21.48% 41.77%
12mpPR 7.67% 23.51% -34.65% -5.13% 9.97% 20.66% 43.65%
Panel A: Risk Statistics
Panel B: Performance Statistics
This table includes the summary statistics for all 61,857 observations in the dataset with active share statement dates
ranging from 12/31/1990 through 09/30/2009. The top two entries, activeshare_min and trackingerror_min, are the
values as reported on Antti Petajisto's website at www.petajisto.net. The remainder of the data comes from CRSP and
Morningstar and matched with the Petajisto data. The number before each calculation represents the number of
months over which the calculation is made and the p, a, or c represent whether the calculation was made ex-ante, ex-
post, or centered on the Active Share statement date.  T-statistics are in parentheses.
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The standard deviation risk statistics are all annualized but the return numbers are raw 
returns over the corresponding number of months. 
The average Active Share in the sample is 78.04%.  This is not particularly 
skewed except for the extreme left tail.  The sample average tracking error, depending on 
how it is calculated, is around 6% and this number is highly positively skewed.  The 
average value of the implied hedge volatility is around 7.5% and this number is also 
highly skewed.  The average Beta in the sample is less than 1 at 0.9703.  In the return 
statistics, the negative average excess returns reflect the expectation that the average 
manager underperforms the benchmark by expenses.  In particular, looking at 12mpER, 
this average underperformance seems to be about 0.33%.  The distribution of ER and 
BAA seems mostly symmetric.   
 Table 2 includes correlation statistics.  The first thing to note is that the original 
measure of trackingerror_min (which is actually the volatility of the regression error, an 
SE measure) from Cremers and Petajisto (2009) is highly correlated to both my measures 
TE and SE from the 12ma and 12mp period.  I also have these statistics calculated for the 
12mc period and the centered period has even higher correlations, as should be expected. 
The other highlighted cells represent the correlation between the SE and TE calculation.  
Recall that these two measures are highly related, particularly when Beta is close to 1.  
The boxes are around the correlations that would signify persistence in the risk measures.  
The 12ma period represents the 12 months immediately preceding the 12mp period.  
These correlations are very high and although I haven’t provided any robust evidence for 
this persistence, it seems initially likely.  The SH measure is substantially higher in 
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correlation when compared to the tracking error numbers than is Active Share.  Active 
Share still is rather correlated but to a lesser degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2
Correlation Table for Risk Statistics
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activeshare_min 1 0.4022 -0.0324 0.3757 0.3853 0.1021 -0.0497 0.3956 0.4056 0.1294
trackingerror_min 0.4022 1 0.0139 0.8267 0.7701 0.7560 0.0090 0.6736 0.6041 0.5989
12maBeta -0.0324 0.0139 1 0.0536 0.1364 0.0627 0.4899 0.0606 0.1172 0.0746
12maTE 0.3757 0.8267 0.0536 1 0.9323 0.9384 0.0683 0.6570 0.5977 0.5851
12maSE 0.3853 0.7701 0.1364 0.9323 1 0.8667 0.1286 0.6519 0.6326 0.5769
12maSH 0.1021 0.7560 0.0627 0.9384 0.8667 1 0.0868 0.5713 0.5054 0.6006
12mpBeta -0.0497 0.0090 0.4899 0.0683 0.1286 0.0868 1 0.0446 0.1154 0.0637
12mpTE 0.3956 0.6736 0.0606 0.6570 0.6519 0.5713 0.0446 1 0.9339 0.9398
12mpSE 0.4056 0.6041 0.1172 0.5977 0.6326 0.5054 0.1154 0.9339 1 0.8676
12mpSH 0.1294 0.5989 0.0746 0.5851 0.5769 0.6006 0.0637 0.9398 0.8676 1
This table includes correlation statistics for all 61,857 observations in the dataset with active share statement dates
ranging from 12/31/1990 through 09/30/2009. The top two entries, activeshare_min and trackingerror_min, are the
values as reported on Antti Petajisto's website at www.petajisto.net. The remainder of the data comes from CRSP and
Morningstar and matched with the Petajisto data. The highlighted cells are emphasized to identify consistency with
two of the concerns with this paper. First, Cremer and Petajisto's calculation of tracking error, although slightly
different than the ones in this paper, have very high correlations with my calculations. Also, the correlation between
tracking error and regression standard error is extremely high. The boxes highlight the persistence of the risk
parameters from one period to the next. All of the risk statistics seem, at least in correlation, highly persistent. T-
statistics are in parentheses.
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In general, this final dataset seems representative of a reasonable sample of 
actively managed portfolios.  It is also reflective of the samples from other papers such as 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008), Amihud and Goyenko (2013), and of course 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009).  Given the performance statistics, at least on the surface, it 
doesn’t seem that the data is biased by survivorship and the distribution of the risk 
parameters are within reasonable thresholds for magnitude and distribution.  
 
V.  Date Analysis and Model Justification  
V.A The Determinants of Active Share 
 A major component and conclusion of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) is that a 
substantial portion of Active Share is described by tracking error.  As shown in section 
III, there is a fundamental and mathematically factual relationship that makes this 
relationship true.  In fact, the expression: 
 TE = AS σH (19) 
is an identity, at least for every individual fund/time observation where the difference 
between the two parameters is merely the volatility of the implied hedge.   
 This identity doesn’t make the cross sectional regression of one component on the 
other irrelevant however.  Take for instance the average value of SH from table 1, 
0.0774.  When regressing Tracking error as the independent variable on Active Share as 
the dependent variable should yield a cross sectional average regression parameter 
reflective of the inverse of the average SH, about 12.9.  In table 3, this regression, 
specification (2), yields a parameter of 1.3205 suggesting that there is some significant  
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Table 3
The Determinants of Active Share and the Volatility of the Implied Hedge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept N/A 0.6996 N/A -0.0222 N/A 0.0103 N/A -0.0009
(711.2203) (26.3247) (84.0938) (8.3742)
12maTE 8.9144 1.3205 1.2085 1.0971
(387.9639) (100.8285) (1216.7348) (675.2632)
activeshare_min 0.0795 0.1069
(387.9639) (100.8285)
12maSH 0.7943 0.8026
(1216.7348) (675.2632)
N 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857
R2 0.7087 0.1565 0.7087 0.1565 0.9599 0.8805 0.9599 0.8805
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept N/A 0.6933 N/A -0.0173 N/A 0.0122 N/A 0.0057
(684.5689) (25.2686) (67.2289) (43.6280)
12maSE 10.7247 1.6598 1.4020 1.2420
(409.0891) (103.8412) (840.8160) (432.1168)
activeshare_min 0.0681 0.0894
(409.0891) (103.8412)
12maSH 0.6559 0.6048
(840.8160) (432.1168)
N 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857
R2 0.7301 0.1484 0.7301 0.1484 0.9195 0.7512 0.9195 0.7512
This table includes all observations with active share statement dates ranging from 12/31/1990 through 09/30/2009.
This table mirrors the active share determination table from Cremers and Petajisto (2009) with the addition of
regressing on the implied hedge volatility. Additionally, recognizing the functional relationship between Active
Share, Tracking Error Volatility, and the Implied Hedge Volatility, this analysis flips the dependent and independent
variables as well as regressing with a zero constant. Given the theoretical relationship between these three
parameters, these simple regressions give insight into whether these parameters can be measured cross-sectionally.
T-statistics are in parentheses.
activeshare_min 12maTE 12maTE
Panel A: Regressions with Tracking Error Volatility
Panel B: Regressions with the Regression Standard Error
12maSH
activeshare_min 12maSE 12maSH 12maSE
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misfit or misspecification in the model.  However, when forcing the intercept to 0, the 
parameter jumps to 8.8144, more in line with our expectation about the theoretical value 
of this parameter.   
 Rather than regress in this direction, the theoretical model suggests that perhaps 
we should regress SE on TE as in specifications (3) and (4).  Note that the value of the 
parameter in specification (3) is 0.0795, which is pretty close to the average value from 
table 1.  This is repeated for SH and TE, attempting to estimate Active Share in the cross 
section and the values are 0.7943 in specification (7) and 0.8026 in specification (8).  
Compared to an average value of 0.7804 in table 1, this is incredibly accurate.  Statistical 
tests to show that the cross-sectional regressed values are different than the averages are 
highly significant but one cannot argue that they are at least in the same economic 
ballpark.  The results of these regressions are highly consistent with the construction from 
section 3 of this essay.  To some extent, this is not surprising given the results from 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009), but the tests here are more theoretically appropriate for 
measuring determination.   
 
V.B The Pricing of Active Share in Relative Performance 
 One of the major conclusions of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) is that Active Share 
is predictive of excess performance.  Additionally, tracking error seems not particularly 
predictive.  The functional relationship in this paper shows that if Active Share has 
predictive power and tracking error does not, then the implied hedge volatility must also 
have predictive power, and in the opposite direction.   
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Table 4
Predictive Regressions of the 6 Month Benchmark Adjusted Alphas Following Active Share Statement Dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept -0.0117 -0.0005 -0.0117 -0.0017 -0.0014 0.0248 -0.0033 0.0027 -0.00565 0.0029
(8.6629) (1.1552) (8.4676) (3.7075) (3.1215) (22.0710) (5.5453) (4.6701) (2.1597) (0.9179)
activeshare_min 0.0146 0.0147 0.0093 -0.0022
(8.6190) (8.5941) (5.0018) (0.7344)
12maSH 0.0035 -0.0010 -0.1181
(0.6832) (0.1973) (4.9826)
12maTE 0.0226 -0.0865 0.0531
(3.7917) (4.8750) (1.6009)
12maSE 0.0223 0.2043 0.2118
(3.0483) (8.5577) (8.8568)
12maBeta -0.0258 -0.0052 -0.0047
(22.9358) (2.3111) (2.0700)
12maSB 0.0200 0.1569 0.1627
(5.6432) (11.2582) (11.6374)
12maSP -0.0187 -0.1651 -0.1699
(5.7829) (10.9828) (11.2800)
N 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857
R2 0.0012 0.0000 0.0012 0.0002 0.0002 0.0084 0.0005 0.0005 0.0118 0.0121
6mpBAA
The dependent variable in these regressions is the 6 month trailing benchmark adjusted alpha, following Active Share
statement dates. All of the independent variables are calculated over the 12 preceding months, except for Active
Share which is a stock variable, and thus provide a look at the predictive nature of the risk parameters. These tests
are full sample, cross-sectional, time-series regressions but are filtered as per the directions in Section 4. T-statistics
are in parentheses.  
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Table 4 is mostly reflective of the data used for these tests in Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009).  The dependent variable is 6 month trailing benchmark adjusted alphas.  
Active Share is highly significant in predicting 6 month trailing benchmark adjusted 
alpha.  For every 1% increase in active share you get about 1.5 bps in excess performance 
over the next 6 months.  Other risk measures are included for robustness.  In fact, it 
seems that the SH is completely insignificant.  In specification (9), Active Share holds its 
level of significance even in the presence of many other potential related risk factors.  
What is surprising is that in specification (10), when SH is reintroduced into the 
regression, is cannibalizes all of the explanatory power of both TE and Active Share.  It 
has a significant effect of -0.1181 thus for a 1% increase in SH, you lose about 12bps of 
risk-adjusted performance for the trailing 6 month period. 
 Table 5 reproduces this analysis using only the trailing 1 month returns.  
Additionally, I have removed the risk-adjusted component of the relative return and this 
table represents only the raw excess return, PR – BR.  Referring to specification (10) 
again, over the following 1 month, for a 1% increase in SH you lose 2.1bps of excess 
performance, which is non-coincidently about 12bps / 6.  Moving left in the table doesn’t 
bode well for Active Share’s significance.  For the trailing 1 month, Active Share does 
particularly poorly explaining the excess performance and SH seems to work well in 
every specification in which it is included.  It is possible that depending on the period in 
which you are interested, either Active Share or SH could both be useful in predicting 
excess return. 
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Table 5
Predictive Regressions of the 1 Month Excess Return Following Active Share Statement Dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0059 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.00169 -0.00012
(2.0179) (3.2537) (1.0565) (4.3045) (4.9135) (14.6774) (0.6399) (2.9714) (1.8324) (0.1082)
activeshare_min -0.0003 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0015
(0.5660) (0.0662) (0.9106) (1.4554)
12maSH -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.0217
(4.9001) (4.8678) (2.6057)
12maTE -0.0088 -0.0097 0.0160
(4.2307) (1.5494) (1.3724)
12maSE -0.0080 0.0032 0.0046
(3.1197) (0.3831) (0.5468)
12maBeta 0.0048 0.0011 0.0012
(11.9563) (1.4456) (1.5690)
12maSB -0.0071 -0.0080 -0.0069
(5.7477) (1.6336) (1.4103)
12maSP -0.0039 0.0034 0.0025
(3.4830) (0.6348) (0.4677)
N 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857 61857
R2 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0023 0.0005 0.0002 0.0009 0.0010
1mpER
The dependent variable in these regressions is the 1 month trailing benchmark excess return, calculated PR - BR,
following Active Share statement dates. All of the independent variables are calculated over the 12 preceding
months, except for Active Share which is a stock variable, and thus provide a look at the predictive nature of the risk
parameters. These tests are full sample, cross-sectional, time-series regressions but are filtered as per the directions
in Section 4.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  
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 Active Share does not seem to perform very when the metric of interest is non-
risk adjusted excess performance.  Table 6 regresses the major risk parameters of interest, 
Active Share, SH, TE, and Beta, on trailing excess returns for 1, 3, 6, and 12 months.  SH 
seems to predict excess performance pretty well across every specification and Active 
share falters, except in the specifications of 6mpER and 12mpER when SH is not 
included in the regression.  It seems that in the presence of SH and TE, TE is 
cannibalizing the significance of Active Share.  This should not be surprising given the 
functional relationship between these variables.  In general, it can be stated that SH tends 
to perform better in the short term and AS in the long term.  I suspect this is due to Active 
Share being more highly persistent that SH.  However, in the presence of TE and SH, 
Active Share seems to lose its role as a predictor of excess return.  
 Rather than considering different time periods of return, Table 7 looks at differing 
measures of absolute and excess performance.  Controlling for TE and Beta, SH gives 
predictable and significant results and those results are meaningful for both ER and BAA.  
Active Share’s results are significant but not as strong and as I have shown before, mixed 
when controlling for SH.  Given this evidence, Active Share is a very useful measure for 
determining the potential for skill in active management, meaning that it is predictive of 
excess returns.  However, when considering SH, Active Share’s contribution is 
overshadowed slightly and SH seems to be the driving force behind the pricing power. 
 Another interesting fact in Table 7 is the relationship between these risk 
parameters and both Benchmark and Portfolio Return, PR and BR.  High Active Share 
seems to signify high future market performance, and symmetrically, low SH also seems  
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to signify high future market performance.  There could potentially be an explanation 
behind the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) and Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) related 
to the idea of aggregate Active Share.  Any persistent factor over time could be a 
candidate.     
  
V.C Alpha sorts as a Robustness Check 
 A major component of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) is that low Active Share 
portfolios tend to underperform on a risk-adjusted basis in addition to high Active Share 
funds outperforming.  Table 8 reaffirms this result.  Low active share funds tend to 
underperform on the trailing 6 months by 0.31% in raw returns and by 0.22% on a risk-
adjusted basis.  And, high Active Share funds tend to outperform by 0.26% in raw excess 
return and by 0.58% in risk adjusted returns.  This pattern for the implied hedge volatility 
is much less obvious.  From quintiles 1-5 in SH the relationship seems to be far from 
monotonic.  When broken down by Active Share quintile, the relationship seems in the 
right direction except in the highest Active Share quintile.  This is the case for both the 
benchmark excess returns and for the benchmark adjusted alphas.  Thus, although the 
Active Share story seems straightforward, there is obviously more going on with SH than 
can be described in a simple cross-sectional regression. 
 Another concern, particularly given the relationship between both Active Share 
and SH to beta, is whether these measures seem to be biased by systematic risk.  For 
Active Share, this has been partially answered by the analysis done in Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009) since they do alpha sorting on risk-adjusted performance for benchmark  
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Table 8
6 Month Equal Weighted Alphas Double Sorted on Active Share and the Volatility of the Implied Hedge
1 2 3 4 5 All 5 - 1
5 -0.26% -0.30% -0.13% 0.04% 1.26% 0.26% 1.51%
(6.6853) (6.8698) (2.4644) (0.5985) (10.6056) (3.2219) (12.1504)
4 -0.04% 0.01% 0.15% -0.12% -0.33% -0.09% -0.29%
(1.1334) (0.1656) (2.5945) (1.7450) (3.4381) (1.4236) (2.8197)
3 -0.11% -0.07% -0.37% -0.61% 0.02% -0.36% 0.13%
(3.3048) (1.7023) (7.5969) (10.4755) (0.2389) (6.5541) (1.5092)
2 -0.12% -0.01% -0.48% -0.27% -0.15% -0.26% -0.04%
(4.0995) (0.2474) (12.5470) (5.6447) (2.3537) (6.1067) (0.5318)
1 -0.12% -0.33% -0.28% -0.18% -0.25% -0.31% -0.13%
(5.5313) (13.5681) (9.8073) (4.6839) (5.0863) (9.5137) (2.4514)
All -0.31% -0.39% -0.42% -0.24% 0.60% -0.15% 0.91%
(26.3971) (25.0229) (20.7910) (9.1672) (14.0312) (5.9159) (20.5869)
5 - 1 -0.14% 0.03% 0.15% 0.22% 1.50% 0.57%
(3.1698) (0.6132) (2.4809) (2.6986) (11.7433) (6.6022)
5 0.12% 0.22% 0.41% 0.56% 1.11% 0.58% 0.98%
(2.7684) (4.4262) (6.9113) (7.0649) (9.4254) (7.1003) (7.8247)
4 -0.04% 0.01% 0.15% -0.12% -0.33% -0.07% -0.29%
(1.1334) (0.1656) (2.5945) (1.7450) (3.4381) (1.1020) (2.8197)
3 -0.11% -0.07% -0.37% -0.61% 0.02% -0.24% 0.13%
(3.3048) (1.7023) (7.5969) (10.4755) (0.2389) (4.3933) (1.5092)
2 -0.12% -0.01% -0.48% -0.27% -0.15% -0.20% -0.04%
(4.0995) (0.2474) (12.5470) (5.6447) (2.3537) (4.6422) (0.5318)
1 -0.12% -0.33% -0.28% -0.18% -0.25% -0.22% -0.13%
(5.5313) (13.5681) (9.8073) (4.6839) (5.0863) (6.7748) (2.4514)
All -0.08% -0.04% -0.10% -0.09% 0.17% -0.03% 0.26%
(6.0322) (2.2235) (4.3521) (3.3213) (4.2937) (1.0643) (6.0222)
5 - 1 0.24% 0.55% 0.69% 0.74% 1.35% 0.80%
(4.8774) (9.8721) (10.5060) (8.3976) (10.6555) (9.0932)
Funds are sorted by two dimensions of risk attributable to active management. The measures of active management
are computed as defined in Section 4. Fund returns are NAV returns are the raw returns for the 6 month period
immediately following the Active Share statement date.  T-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel B: Benchmark Adjusted Alphas
Panel A: Benchmark Excess Returns
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Table 9
6 Month Equal Weighted Alphas Double Sorted on Active Share and Beta
1 2 3 4 5 All 5 - 1
5 0.07% 0.07% 0.43% 0.82% 0.20% 0.26% 0.13%
(0.9326) (1.0430) (5.9968) (10.0299) (2.2044) (3.2219) (1.0673)
4 0.54% 0.04% 0.09% 0.04% -0.87% -0.09% -1.41%
(8.8340) (0.7450) (1.4614) (0.5741) (10.6901) (1.4236) (13.8540)
3 0.15% -0.37% -0.23% -0.21% -0.50% -0.36% -0.65%
(2.6082) (7.5898) (5.0790) (3.8932) (8.0294) (6.5541) (7.7187)
2 0.17% -0.17% -0.30% -0.34% -0.28% -0.26% -0.45%
(3.9224) (4.6717) (7.4905) (7.7039) (5.7251) (6.1067) (6.8800)
1 0.33% -0.11% -0.33% -0.25% -0.52% -0.31% -0.84%
(8.2537) (3.6413) (10.9295) (8.4882) (12.6067) (9.5137) (14.8056)
All -0.24% -0.51% -0.29% 0.14% 0.16% -0.15% 0.40%
(8.2936) (23.7931) (14.5308) (6.0780) (4.9511) (5.9159) (9.2700)
5 - 1 -0.25% 0.18% 0.75% 1.07% 0.72% 0.57%
(2.9111) (2.3946) (9.7590) (12.3312) (7.2051) (6.6022)
5 1.51% 0.87% 0.71% 0.60% -0.99% 0.58% -2.50%
(19.5585) (11.7536) (10.0302) (7.1088) (10.2921) (7.1003) (20.2896)
4 0.54% 0.04% 0.09% 0.04% -0.87% -0.07% -1.41%
(8.8340) (0.7450) (1.4614) (0.5741) (10.6901) (1.1020) (13.8540)
3 0.15% -0.37% -0.23% -0.21% -0.50% -0.24% -0.65%
(2.6082) (7.5898) (5.0790) (3.8932) (8.0294) (4.3933) (7.7187)
2 0.17% -0.17% -0.30% -0.34% -0.28% -0.20% -0.45%
(3.9224) (4.6717) (7.4905) (7.7039) (5.7251) (4.6422) (6.8800)
1 0.33% -0.11% -0.33% -0.25% -0.52% -0.22% -0.84%
(8.2537) (3.6413) (10.9295) (8.4882) (12.6067) (6.7748) (14.8056)
All 0.68% 0.03% -0.10% -0.09% -0.67% -0.03% -1.35%
(24.7286) (1.3490) (4.6281) (3.6688) (20.5498) (1.0643) (31.6825)
5 - 1 1.19% 0.98% 1.03% 0.86% -0.47% 0.80%
(13.6588) (12.2603) (13.4943) (9.5255) (4.5017) (9.0932)
Funds are sorted by two dimensions of risk attributable to active management. The measures of active management
are computed as defined in Section 4. Fund returns are NAV returns are the raw returns for the 6 month period
immediately following the Active Share statement date.  T-statistics are in parentheses.
Beta Quintiles
Panel A: Benchmark Excess Returns
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Table 10
6 Month Equal Weighted Alphas Double Sorted on the Volatility of the Implied Hedge and Beta
1 2 3 4 5 All 5 - 1
5 0.65% 0.34% 0.37% 1.81% 0.28% 0.60% -0.36%
(7.1027) (3.8869) (3.9835) (19.0482) (2.8251) (6.2750) (2.6593)
4 0.15% -0.14% 0.11% 0.00% -0.44% -0.24% -0.58%
(2.5458) (2.5074) (1.8033) (0.0734) (6.4862) (4.0997) (6.5731)
3 0.68% -0.28% -0.14% -0.23% -0.48% -0.42% -1.16%
(15.0970) (5.6859) (2.8825) (4.3533) (9.7164) (9.2980) (17.3396)
2 0.69% 0.10% -0.26% -0.28% -0.37% -0.39% -1.07%
(18.3362) (2.7368) (6.7271) (6.8842) (8.8986) (11.1906) (18.8925)
1 0.48% 0.13% -0.16% -0.25% -0.31% -0.31% -0.79%
(14.6187) (4.1961) (5.4312) (8.6925) (8.6624) (11.8052) (16.3100)
All -0.24% -0.51% -0.29% 0.14% 0.16% -0.15% 0.40%
(8.2936) (23.7931) (14.5308) (6.0780) (4.9511) (5.9159) (9.2700)
5 - 1 0.16% 0.21% 0.53% 2.07% 0.59% 0.91%
(1.6809) (2.2068) (5.4525) (20.7589) (5.5339) (9.2068)
5 1.06% 0.55% 0.42% 0.85% -1.12% 0.17% -2.18%
(13.0013) (6.3321) (4.8643) (9.1688) (11.5103) (1.9202) (17.1757)
4 0.15% -0.14% 0.11% 0.00% -0.44% -0.09% -0.58%
(2.5458) (2.5074) (1.8033) (0.0734) (6.4862) (1.4853) (6.5731)
3 0.68% -0.28% -0.14% -0.23% -0.48% -0.10% -1.16%
(15.0970) (5.6859) (2.8825) (4.3533) (9.7164) (1.9463) (17.3396)
2 0.69% 0.10% -0.26% -0.28% -0.37% -0.04% -1.07%
(18.3362) (2.7368) (6.7271) (6.8842) (8.8986) (0.9944) (18.8925)
1 0.48% 0.13% -0.16% -0.25% -0.31% -0.08% -0.79%
(14.6187) (4.1961) (5.4312) (8.6925) (8.6624) (2.6977) (16.3100)
All 0.68% 0.03% -0.10% -0.09% -0.67% -0.03% -1.35%
(24.7286) (1.3490) (4.6281) (3.6688) (20.5498) (1.0643) (31.6825)
5 - 1 0.58% 0.42% 0.58% 1.10% -0.81% 0.26%
(6.5504) (4.5043) (6.3804) (11.3623) (7.8449) (2.6932)
Beta Quintiles
Panel A: Benchmark Excess Returns
Panel B: Benchmark Adjusted Alphas
Funds are sorted by two dimensions of risk attributable to active management. The measures of active management
are computed as defined in Section 4. Fund returns are NAV returns are the raw returns for the 6 month period
immediately following the Active Share statement date.  T-statistics are in parentheses.
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relative Alphas and four factor alphas9.  However, for comparison refer to Table 9.  This 
is a double sort of Active Share and Beta.  This table attempts to answer the question 
about whether active share and beta have a relationship.  Except for a few exceptions, 
Active Share seems to retain its property of outperformance in the highest quintile and 
underperformance in the lowest quintile under both specifications of the relative 
performance.  Beta on the other hand is particularly mixed.  As we would expect, in raw 
excess return, high beta outperforms low beta but in benchmark adjusted alphas, is 
strongly significantly underperforms.  This is consistent with the cross sectional 
regressions from the previous part. 
 Table 10 is a double sort of implied hedge volatility on Beta.  Just as with the 
sorts of SH and Active Share, SH seems to behave rather strangely in the highest quintile.  
Whereas it behaves as expected in the lower 4 quintiles, the highest quintile SH actually 
outperforms rather than underperforms.  Beta’s characteristics are similar to the results 
from Table 9 in that the lowest quintile outperforms the highest quintile all around.  In 
aggregate, this analysis is consistent with the regressions but the strange result in the 5th 
SH quintile probably deserves further consideration. 
  
VI.  Conclusion 
 Active Share was introduced to the academic literature by Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009).  Active Share takes a difficult functional form and they show that it is predictive 
of excess return.  In this paper, I re-parameterized Active Share into a more familiar and 
9 See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) 
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usable analytical form.  This form includes the metrics we are accustomed to analyzing in 
portfolio analysis.  I compared and contrasted the predictive power of Active Share with 
its new counterpart, the implied hedge volatility.  This attribution shows that Active 
Share and the implied hedge volatility are reflections of each other around tracking error.  
And, if one has predictive power in excess return, the other probably does as well.  I 
follow this theoretical attribution and re-parameterization with empirical analysis to both 
reaffirm the predictive effects of Active Share and to compare the predictive effects of 
Active Share with that of the implied hedge volatility.  Active Share dominates in 
benchmark adjusted alpha style relative return prediction but the implied hedge volatility 
tends to dominate when looking at raw excess returns.  Additionally, as you extend the 
time period of estimation, Active Share’s predictive power strengthens.  However, the 
implied hedge volatility is significant throughout all time periods (but perhaps diminishes 
around 12 months). 
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CHAPTER 3. TEV OPTIMIZATION AND UTILITY 
 
I.  Introduction 
Delegated contracting in investment management is the most popular and 
predominant form of management in the modern investment industry.  This delegated 
portfolio management creates a classical incentive problem where the additional 
incentives that affect the agent, the delegated manager, are not completely consistent with 
the incentives of principal.  It is generally accepted and consistently asserted through 
theory that this delegated incentive leads to sub-optimal, less-good, portfolios.  This is 
particularly true when comparing the portfolio that the principal would build, given the 
same level of expertise and opportunity, to the portfolio the agent would build given the 
delegated incentives.  If the portfolio choice problem is thought of as an optimization 
problem, then it is not difficult to imagine that the delegated incentives create binding 
constraints that can at best generate portfolios that are equally preferred to the 
unconstrained choice.  Most likely the constraints will lead to sub-optimal portfolios.  
This sub-optimality is often considered as borderline irrational in the literature and is 
used as an argument either for passive investment management or for the inefficiency of 
using benchmarks portfolios as performance measures.  However, given the 
pervasiveness of delegated contracting in the investment industry, it is difficult to think 
that so many professionals have it wrong.  The more important question is, “Do the 
predominant delegated incentives lead to better portfolios than the principals could build 
themselves since they have less skill and opportunity?”       
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 Portfolio theory and asset pricing were developed under the assumption that the 
agent in the delegated relationship is a perfect agent whose incentives are perfectly 
aligned with those of the principal.  Seminal work such as Markowitz (1952), Sharpe 
(1964), and Lintner (1965) paved the path for most modern investment research but like 
most foundational research, simplifying assumptions are made that potentially distort 
reality.  It is evident that researchers and practitioners alike were concerned with the 
delegated incentive problem from the early life of investment theory but not many had 
done work critiquing how the relative incentive affected the theoretical models.  An early 
example of an influential paper that discusses the delegated portfolio management 
situation in depth is Treynor and Black (1973).  Although this paper is much more about 
reconciling inefficiency in markets, exploited through security selection, with an 
equilibrium look at an efficient market, the structure of how researchers approach the 
delegated incentive problem derives from Treynor and Black’s approach in considering 
security selection versus the market portfolio, a benchmark.         
 One of the earliest criticisms and direct recognitions of the unrepresentativeness 
of Markowitz mean-variance space and subsequently the CAPM came from Professor 
Sharpe himself in Sharpe (1981).  Sharpe hypothesizes that it is highly unlikely that 
mean-variance efficiency can be obtained in a decentralized portfolio management setting 
where the investment decision-making responsibilities are delegated to an agent, in 
particular multiple agents.  He proposes the foundation of a delegated incentive problem 
in multiple external agents and is skeptical of an optimal solution.  Elton and Gruber 
(2004) solve the problem, albeit with some very narrow constraints, suggesting that 
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delegated portfolio management could reach optimality.  However, vanBisburgen, 
Brandt, and Koijen (2008) revisits the problem relaxing the assumption about the 
certainty of the agents’ risk appetite and concludes that serious inefficiency exists without 
this assumption.  Blake et. al. (2013) uses the BBK framework and applies it to the 
delegated relationships in the pension industry and, among many other things, shows that 
the delegated incentive is pervasive in professional investment management. 
 Although Sharpe (1981) may have motivated the study of delegated portfolio 
management, another seminal paper in the area is Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985).  
This paper set the stage for studying the delegated incentive as a principal/agent problem.  
In this paper they model a utility relationship between the principal and the agent.  Their 
model implies the same conclusions of the other research, that it is unlikely that the 
delegation can reach optimality in utility.  A direct follow-up to this work, Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1997), assumes that the motivating factor behind the delegated incentive 
involves a conditional optimization and a benchmark that is the solution to the Markowitz 
optimization problem given the limited set of information.  Their conclusion is again 
consistent with the other literature on the subject; the conditional optimization leads to 
necessary sub-optimality in portfolio choice.      
 This is the same conclusion reached in Roll (1992) albeit by a slightly different 
construction.  Roll builds a framework much more closely related to Markowitz (1952) 
but instead of investment managers optimizing in mean/variance space, they optimize in 
mean and tracking error variance, the relative variance.  This leads to a frontier, the TEV 
(Tracking Error Volatility) frontier that passes through the benchmark portfolio.  The 
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dependence on a benchmark as a relative incentive is the connection between Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1997) and Roll (1992).  The overriding implication of Roll’s construction is 
that agents optimize utility in mean and tracking error volatility, not in mean and 
variance.  If we assume that the principal derives utility in mean-variance space and that 
the relative incentive causes the delegated agent to derive utility in mean-TEV space, 
then the broad implication of Roll’s TEV frontier optimization is that we need to study 
the transformation of the agent’s utility from a relative optimization to the principal’s 
utility in absolute optimization.   
If, for example, we assume that the portfolio used to benchmark the external 
manager is the principal’s best option, then we can consider the principal’s utility curve 
going through that benchmark as the highest utility the principal can obtain given his 
information.  The delegation to an external manager, as long as the principal’s utility 
curve is not tangent to his opportunity set, the TEV frontier, at the benchmark, 
necessarily has a utility increasing deviation for the principal as long as the agent has 
better information or more skill than the principal and proper constraints are applied.  The 
contribution of this essay is in directly extending Roll’s framework by recognizing that 
the relative optimization problem can produce higher utility for the principal.  Although it 
is true that the principal, given all the information and skill of the agent, would build a 
different and better portfolio, except for a very specific and unlikely case, the agent can 
still create higher utility for the principal than the default benchmark, even given the 
inefficiency of relative optimization. 
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The closest application of a utility problem directly to Roll’s TEV frontier is in 
Bertrand (2010).  In this paper he considers the problem of a fixed risk aversion 
constraint in mean/variance and its ability to generate preferred portfolios.  My 
assumption is slightly different that Bertrand’s in that managers cannot, in my 
framework, be constrained on risk aversion in mean and variance but only in risk 
aversion in mean and TEV.  Although these spaces are related, they are different enough 
that they lead to very different conclusions.  Based on my assumptions, Bertrand’s iso-
risk aversion curves are the path that a principal would like to follow, not the path the 
delegated manager actually follows.  In section II, I look at the space of mean-TEV and 
translate it back to mean-variance.  It is a direct application of Roll’s construction with a 
relative utility overlay.  The path an unconstrained relative optimizer would follow is far 
inferior to the efficient frontier and equivalent to the TEV frontier at the agent’s portfolio 
choice given changes in the agent’s risk aversion level.  However it is still likely that this 
path increases utility for the principal, at least over some controllable range of 
possibilities.  Section III considers the relationship of principal utility in the space of 
mean and variance given the principal’s best alternative, investing in the benchmark, to 
the TEV frontier in mean-variance.  I show that the delegated manager can almost 
universally increase the principal’s utility. 
Another important paper that stems directly from Roll (1992) is Jorion (2003), in 
which Jorion considers the frontier in mean variance space given a constraint to tracking 
error variance.  This is an important problem in practice because in examples of real 
world delegated investment management, oftentimes external managers are constrained 
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by a tracking error bound.  In a similar fashion to Roll, Jorion concludes that the tracking 
error bound most likely incentivizes agents to take more variance than the benchmark in 
portfolio selection and that this constraint should be used with caution when applied to 
external managers.  Using my relative utility framework, I show in section IV of this 
paper that when given only a tracking error constraint, principals can control the risk 
level of the external manager to guarantee that the portfolio selected by an agent will 
increase the principal’s utility.  If implemented properly, the tracking error constraint 
placed by principals on external managers is rational. 
  Another pervasive constraint applied to external managers in the industry is the 
constraint related to style drift.  We can calculate beta relative to the underlying 
benchmark and consider deviations from factor sensitivity of 1 to be deviations due to 
style drift.  Although this constraint is controversial in the industry, it is necessary for 
many of the theoretical conclusions in active portfolio management, most notably the 
Fundamental Law of Active Management, which is summarized well in Grinold and 
Kahn (2000).  Roll (1992), in addition to deriving the TEV frontier, also considers a 
number of other problems, one being constraining benchmark relative beta.  His 
conclusion is that the beta constraint generates a necessarily superior frontier to the TEV 
frontier in the region over which external managers are likely to optimize.  I look at this 
beta constraint in the context of my relative utility overlay in section V and conclude 
much the same with similar caveats.  However, the most interesting result of analyzing 
the beta constraint is that it always has the potential to increase the principal’s utility.  
There are a couple scenarios under the tracking error constraint that, however unlikely, 
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could cause the delegated manager to act against the interests of the principal.  As long as 
the benchmark is above the global minimum variance portfolio in return, the beta 
constraint always has the potential to increase principal utility, particularly if the 
benchmark has a higher expected return that the minimum variance portfolio.  Thus, just 
like the tracking error constraint, constraining external managers on beta is also rational. 
The beta constraint itself is not enough to guarantee a superior portfolio from 
delegated management either.  It is quite possible for the external manager, given low 
enough levels of risk aversion, to build a portfolio less efficient than without the 
constraint.  Additionally, the tracking error constraint, however rational and possibly 
utility increasing, still lies on a frontier below that of a constrained beta frontier.  It seems 
natural that the combination of these two constraints could force a delegated manager to 
invest on a frontier superior to the TEV frontier and additionally assure the principal that 
the external manager will not invest in a portfolio risky enough to erode utility.  In 
section VI, I analyze the inclusion of both the tracking error constraint and the beta 
constraint in controlling a delegated agent.  These constraints, if implemented properly, 
necessarily cause the delegated manager to choose a portfolio that increases utility for the 
principal.  I use these constraints to develop a benchmarking strategy to force external 
managers to not only build a portfolio that increases utility, but to build a portfolio that 
maximizes the principal’s utility given the agents opportunity set.  Essentially, if the 
parameters are known, setting the tracking error and beta constraints to the levels of the 
desired portfolio, even the global optimal portfolio for the principal, incentivizes the 
agent to buy that exact portfolio.  These two constraints are enough to pin the delegated 
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manager to an exact location within investment opportunity set.  They guarantee not only 
a unique but a superior portfolio. 
The conclusion of this work is that if we believe delegated investment managers 
to have skill and expertise, then it is not only rational but preferred to delegate our 
investment management responsibilities to those individuals, even given that they are 
relative TEV optimizers.  The big caveat here is the assumption that the external manager 
really does have the ability to outperform a benchmark.  Two of the most popular risk 
control metrics in the industry, beta constraints and tracking error constraints, can be used 
to pin the external manager to an exact spot in mean-variance space.  If the principal 
understands his own utility in this space, and has an idea of what the external manager’s 
skill and capabilities are, then this spot is a necessary utility increase for the principal.  
The delegated portfolio choice, when delegated to a skillful agent and under the tracking 
error and beta constraints, is always better than the portfolio a principal could build 
himself.  
 
II.  The TEV Frontier and the Agent’s Objective Function 
 The Markowitz mean-variance optimization problem involves minimizing the 
variance of a portfolio of securities.  There are many well-known solutions to the 
Markowitz problem but perhaps the most popular is considering the problem as a 
quadratic programming problem.  Below are the variable definitions and the problem’s 
statement and solution.  Matrices and vectors are in boldface. 
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 w  - n × 1 the weight vector of the portfolio 
 Ω - n × n covariance matric (symmetric and positive definite) 
 r - n × 1 vector of returns 
 1 - n × 1 vector of 1’s 
The problem is to minimize the variance as a function of return given that the weight 
vector sums to 100%: 
 min
𝐰𝐰
𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰   𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟 (1) 
We can set up the Lagrangian as follows: 
 L(𝐰𝐰,  𝜆𝜆1,  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟) = 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 −  𝜆𝜆1 (𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 − 1)  −  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟 (𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝑟𝑟) (2) 
Next we differentiate and set the results to 0: 
 2𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 −  𝜆𝜆1𝟏𝟏 −  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝐫𝐫 = 𝟎𝟎 
𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 
𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟 
 
(3) 
Solving this system for w yields the following: (notation such as [1    r] is an n × 2 
augmented matrix where the first column is all 1’s and the second is the return vector; 
also, the last matrix in this notation is a 2 × 1 vector with the constants 1 and r): 
 
𝐰𝐰 =  𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫] �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1 
𝑟𝑟
� (4) 
This weight vector can be plugged back into variance function and the parabola of the 
minimum variance set, i.e. the efficient frontier, can be expressed with the variance of the 
portfolio, σ2, as a function of the return constant, r. In essence, this is the equation for the 
efficient frontier. 
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𝜎𝜎2 = 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 = � 1 
𝑟𝑟
�
′
�[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1 
𝑟𝑟
� (5) 
The Tracking Error Variance or TEV Frontier from Roll (1992) can be derived similarly 
but with a slightly different objective function.  If the weight vector for the benchmark is 
denoted as b, then Roll’s framework requires minimizing tracking error variance by 
choosing w.  The problem proceeds similarly but with a slight complication because of 
the differenced weight vector (w – b).  Below is a statement of the problem and the 
subsequent Lagrangian: 
 min
𝐰𝐰
 𝑇𝑇2 =  min
𝐰𝐰
(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)   𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟 L(𝐰𝐰,  𝜆𝜆1,  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟) = (𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)  −  𝜆𝜆1 (𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 − 1)  −  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟 (𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝑟𝑟) 
(6) 
(7) 
Below is the system of simultaneous equations to be solved.  It is the same as the original 
problem but with the extra term, 2Ωb: 
 2𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰− 2𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 −  𝜆𝜆1𝟏𝟏 −  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝐫𝐫 = 𝟎𝟎 
𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 
𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟  
 
(8) 
In a similar form to what was derived for the variance minimization, in the case of 
tracking error variance we choose the following weight vector where rb = b′r. 
 
𝐰𝐰 = 𝐛𝐛 +  𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫] �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 0 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏� (9) 
This weight vector can be plugged bask into the variance function and an expression for 
the parabola of the TEV frontier as a function of r can be obtained.  If we define σb2 = 
b’Ωb then: 
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𝜎𝜎2 = 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 = 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 + � 0 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏�′ �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 �  0 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏�+ 2 � 1 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏�′ �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 0 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏� 
(10) 
The relationship between the efficient frontier from (5) and the TEV frontier from (10) is 
illustrated and analyzed thoroughly in Roll (1992).  Roll’s primary conclusion is that the 
TEV frontier is less optimal than the efficient frontier whenever the benchmark portfolio 
is not on the efficient frontier.  This is illustrated in Figure 1, Panel A.  The TEV frontier 
is to the right of the efficient frontier because optimization on relative tracking error 
variance rather than absolute variance is less efficient.  The horizontal axis in this figure 
is standard deviation.  However, it is probably more useful to look at this diagram with 
tracking error volatility on the horizontal axis.  This graph, with tracking error on the 
horizontal axis, is depicted in Figure 1 panel B and the equations for the curves are 
derived as follows. 
 First recall that the tracking error variance, T 2, is defined as follows: 
 𝑇𝑇2 = (𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) (11) 
For the TEV frontier, we simply take the weight vector from (9) and move b to the left 
hand side. 
 (𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) =  𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫] �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 0 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏� (12) 
Plugging this vector into the tracking error variance equation yields the following 
parabola where T 2 is a function of r.  This is the TEV frontier in the space of mean and 
tracking error variance rather than in mean and variance.  This is, not coincidently, just 
one of the terms from equation (10). 
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Figure 1
The TEV Frontier and the Agent’s Objective Function
Panel A: Mean-Variance Space
Panel B: Mean-TEV Space
This figure shows how an agent, when maximizing utility in mean-TEV space, chooses a portfolio 
along the TEV frontier in Panel B.  This portfolio is translated back into mean-variance space, in 
Panel A, and as is evident, the portfolio lies along the sub-optimal TEV frontier in that space as 
well.
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𝑇𝑇2 = � 0 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏�′ �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 0 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏� (13) 
Given the weight vector for the efficient frontier from equation (4), we can adjust it by 
differencing it with the benchmark as follows.  Note that a b was just subtracted from 
both sides. 
 (𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) =  𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫] �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1 
𝑟𝑟
� − 𝐛𝐛 (14) 
Plugging this vector into the tracking error variance equation yields the following 
parabola.  This is the equation for the efficient frontier when plotted in the space of 
tracking error variance. 
 
𝑇𝑇2 = � 1 
𝑟𝑟
�
′
�[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1 
𝑟𝑟
� + 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2
− 2 � 1 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏�′ �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1 𝑟𝑟 � 
(15) 
The mean variance frontier, when mapped to tracking error variance space is to the right 
of the TEV frontier just like the TEV frontier is to the right of the efficient frontier when 
in the space of absolute variance.  This is the phenomenon illustrated in Figure 1, Panel 
B. 
One of the most important implications of the TEV frontier is the implication 
about how delegated managers choose portfolios given a relative performance incentive.  
That is, they optimize return relative to tracking error rather than variance or standard 
deviation.  This implication also directly asserts that agents will optimize a utility 
function that is parameterized with tracking error volatility as the risk measure rather than 
standard deviation.  No matter the exact structure of the utility relationship, utility and 
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preference in relative space can be thought of exactly like it is thought of in absolute 
space.  The preference set is a closed, convex set and increases to the “northwest” just as 
it does in mean-variance.  Also, the iso-utility curve is upward sloping with a non-
negative second derivative.  The iso-utility curve associated with optimizing utility in 
relative space sits exactly tangent to the TEV frontier in relative space and this is 
illustrated in Figure 1 Panel B.  For the purposes of illustration, I derive all of the utility 
relationships using quadratic utility but it should be evident that any properly formed 
utility function generally obeys all of the rules of the quadratic utility for the purposes of 
this essay. 
 Suppose the utility function for the agent is as follows where θ is the coefficient 
of risk aversion: 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑟𝑟 − 𝜃𝜃 𝑇𝑇2 = 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) (16) 
The problem is to maximize utility subject to the constraint on the weight vector. 
 max
𝐰𝐰
 𝑈𝑈 =  max
𝐰𝐰
 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)   𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 L(𝐰𝐰,  𝜆𝜆1) = 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)  −  𝜆𝜆1 (𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 − 1)  
(17) 
(18) 
Differentiating the Lagrangian and finding the critical value yields the following solution 
for the optimal weight vector:  
 
𝐰𝐰 = 12𝜃𝜃 𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏 �𝐫𝐫 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏� + 𝐛𝐛 (19) 
The portfolio representing this optimal weight vector is depicted in Figure 1, Panels A 
and B, with two different levels of risk aversion.  In Panel A, it is necessarily along the 
TEV frontier above the benchmark portfolio and it is notable that it not possible for this 
portfolio to be on the efficient frontier unless the benchmark is also on the efficient 
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frontier.  As the agent’s risk aversion coefficient decreases, the agent chooses a portfolio 
further and further up the TEV frontier.  In Panel B, this portfolio is the optimal 
allocation and along the TEV frontier.  Also depicted in Panel B is the iso-utility curve 
associated with this portfolio’s level of utility.  It can be back-solved simply by 
rearranging the utility function from (16) and plugging in the weight vector from (19), 
and it is expressed as follows: 
 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑈𝑈 + 𝜃𝜃 𝑇𝑇2 = 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) + 𝜃𝜃 𝑇𝑇2
= 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 + 14𝜃𝜃 �𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 � + 𝜃𝜃 𝑇𝑇2 
 
(20) 
Delegated managers that are incentivized by a relative return incentive will optimize 
along the TEV frontier and maximize relative utility in the space of mean and tracking 
error volatility.  This gives rise to the utility relationship as depicted in (20).  This is the 
agent’s iso-utility curve and in general it is inconsistent with the process of maximizing 
utility in mean/variance space, the space in which the principal derives utility. 
 Table 1 calculates the quadratic utility deviations for the principal under differing 
scenarios.  Panel A depicts the utility increase or decrease for the principal from 
unconstrained delegated contracting.  The delegated performance incentive has the 
potential to increase utility for the principal but this is far from certain.  Given the levels 
of utility I use in the figures for this paper, the utility decreases by 5.15% through 
delegation.  Panel B shows the utility depreciation from the principal's global optimal 
portfolio.  This is necessarily non-positive.  In this paper, the agent chooses a portfolio 
that 9.25% less optimal in utility than the principal's global optimal.  This example is  
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consistent with what was shown above.  Although the agent has the potential to increase 
utility above that of the benchmark, unconstrained there is no guarantee for utility 
improvement. 
 
III.  The Principal’s Utility and Improvements Along the TEV Frontier 
 As is conventional in portfolio management literature, I assume that the principal 
investor derives utility in mean-variance space.  Thus his goal is to maximize utility 
subject to the constraint of the mean-variance efficient frontier.  The premise of this essay 
is that principals delegate portfolio management responsibilities because they lack the 
ability or opportunity to build efficient portfolios themselves.  The principal expects the 
delegated manager to build a portfolio better than the principal could build.  Therefore 
the most logical basis for determining whether an agent improves upon the principal’s 
utility is to compare the agent portfolio choice to whatever the principal could build given 
his limited skill level and opportunity set.  If we suppose that the principal benchmarks 
the external manager against his best alternative, and incentivizes the agent relative to 
this benchmark (implicitly or explicitly), then this necessitates that the principal’s utility 
curve pass through that benchmark portfolio.  In the previous section we showed how the 
agent derives utility to create the TEV frontier.  The relative positioning and interaction 
between these two curves, the TEV frontier and the principal’s iso-utility curve, is what 
determines whether the agent can indeed improve the principal’s utility given the 
delegated performance incentive.    
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 Just as before when discussing the agent’s utility, as long as the principal’s utility 
is well formed, upward sloping with a non-negative second derivative in mean-variance 
space, the exact expression of the utility relationship is irrelevant to the conclusions of 
this essay.  Utility is increasing for the principal to the “northwest” and the preference set 
is closed and convex.  Notably, the opportunity set underneath the TEV envelope in 
mean-variance space is also a closed convex set.  As discussed previously, these two sets 
intersect at least once, at portfolio b, which lies on the boundary of both sets.  Unless the 
TEV frontier and the utility curve are exactly tangent at the benchmark portfolio, then the 
opportunity for utility improvement exists because in this framework there would be an 
overlap between the sets.  There are four interesting cases of how these two sets could 
intersect, and these cases affect how the principal should constrain the external manager 
to assure utility improvement.  The first three cases involve the slope of the sets at the 
intersection point, b, assuming b is above the minimum variance point.  The slope of the 
utility curve can be steeper, flatter, or the same as the TEV frontier at this point.  The 
fourth case is when the intersection happens given b is below the minimum variance 
portfolio.  These cases are analyzed heuristically in Figure 2 and analytically with 
derivations in quadratic utility.     
 The steepness of the utility relationship is equivalent to the level of risk aversion.  
The higher the coefficient of risk aversion is, the steeper is the utility relationship in mean 
and variance.  Below is an example of the utility function of the principal and note that is 
it parameterized in mean and variance.  θ is the coefficient of risk aversion.  And once 
again, quadratic utility is used in this example for simplicity in expression.  In general, all 
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of the assertions and conclusions in this essay are true no matter the exact form of the 
utility function.  Thus, suppose principals maximize utility by choosing w given the 
following relationship: 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑟𝑟 − 𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 (21) 
If the principal had the ability and opportunity to maximize this utility function given the 
universe of all investment opportunities, he would choose a portfolio by maximizing this 
function, unconstrained as follows: 
 max
𝐰𝐰
 𝑈𝑈 =  max
𝐰𝐰
 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰   𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 L(𝐰𝐰,  𝜆𝜆1) = 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 −  𝜆𝜆1 (𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 − 1) 
(22) 
(23) 
Differentiating the Lagrangian and finding the critical value yields the following result. 
 
𝐰𝐰 = 12𝜃𝜃 𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏 �𝐫𝐫 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 2𝜃𝜃𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝟏𝟏� (24) 
This is the weight vector of the portfolio that the principal would ideally like to hold 
given the agent’s opportunity set.  Applying this vector to the utility relationship in (21) 
reveals the maximum iso-utility curve given the constraint of the efficient frontier. 
 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑈𝑈 + 𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 + 𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎2
= 14𝜃𝜃 �𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 2𝜃𝜃)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 � + 𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎2 
 
(25) 
This level of utility is practically unreachable however because of the principal’s lack of 
ability and opportunity.  I assumed earlier that the principal can select a portfolio b that 
maximizes utility given his constrained skillset.  If this is the portfolio on which the 
principal measures and incentivizes the agent, then this is the same b from the TEV 
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analysis in section II.  The utility of portfolio b and the iso-utility curve associated with 
the utility of portfolio b are expressed as follows: 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝐛𝐛′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃𝐛𝐛′𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 = 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑈𝑈 + 𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 + 𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 + 𝜃𝜃 (𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2) (26) (27) 
Thus, we are concerned about the interaction between the curve from (27) and the curve 
from (10), the TEV frontier. 
 Figure 2, Panel A shows the most likely (or at least the most convenient) scenario 
for this relationship.  In this case, the slope of the TEV frontier is steeper than the slope 
of the principal’s utility curve at b.  Recall from section II and also from Roll (1992) that 
an agent optimizing based on a relative incentive will choose a portfolio by moving along 
the TEV frontier up from the benchmark portfolio.  In this case, since the utility curve has 
a flatter slope than the TEV frontier at the intersection point b, the preference set, the set 
above the iso-utility curve, overlaps with the opportunity set, the set underneath the TEV 
envelope, and every point in the intersection is a utility increase for the principal.  In 
particular, as the agent’s risk aversion level decreases, he differentiates from the 
benchmark and moves up the curve into this preferred space.  Eventually however, the 
agent’s risk aversion level could get so low that his optimization process pushes the 
portfolio back out of the preferred space.  Therefore, if the agent is allowed to act on his 
own unconstrained utility, it is still likely that he will build a portfolio that decreases the 
principal’s utility even though he could have increased it by buying a portfolio within the 
preferred region.  I will discuss a method to constrain the agent in the next section but  
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Figure 2
Different Scenarios of how the TEV Frontier can Interact with Principal Utility
Panel A: TEV Frontier Steeper than Utility Curve at b
Panel B: TEV Frontier Flatter than Utility Curve at b
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Panel C: TEV Frontier Steeper tangent to Utility Curve at b
Panel D: Benchmark portfolio, b, Below the Minimum Variance Portfolio
This figure depicts the 4 cases of interaction between the TEV frontier and the principal's iso-utility curve.  
The utility curve of the principal passes through the benchmark, b, and this is the point the principal is 
trying to improve upon through delegation.  The MV frontier is shown as a lightly dotted line.  Except for 
the case of Panel C, there is always a utility improvement for the principal along the TEV frontier.
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what should be evident at this point is that delegated portfolio management very likely 
could increase principal utility. 
 Figure 2, Panel B shows the opposite scenario to Panel A.  In this case, the 
principal’s utility curve is steeper than the TEV frontier at b.  Although a space still 
exists in the intersection of the preference set and the opportunity set, this space is on the 
wrong side of b.  The process the agent follows when incentivized with the relative return 
inventive will push the portfolio choice away from the preferred region rather than into it.  
This may seem like a dire situation, but there is a simple transformation in this space that 
allows the relative incentive to continue to be used to the principal’s advantage.  First we 
should recognize that the principal’s utility must have a flatter slope at b than the line 
segment that connects portfolio b to the origin.  This is true only if we assume that the 
origin could be a potential long investment opportunity for the principal.  If the line 
segment is not steeper than the utility curve then there exists a portfolio on the line 
segment with a higher utility than portfolio b, and this violates the assumption behind 
portfolio b.  That is, portfolio b must be the highest utility portfolio available to the 
principal given his skill level and opportunity set.  This condition assures us that this line 
segment intersects the TEV frontier below the set where the preference set intersects with 
the opportunity set.  If we define this lower intersection point as point bL, then we have 
transformed the Case B problem into a Case A problem.  If the delegated manager is now 
benchmarked against bL, then we are back into a situation where the delegated manager 
can create a utility increase under the right constraints.  Care must be taken in this 
situation however because the principal needs to worry not only about the agent taking 
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too much risk but also not taking enough risk.  Deviations up the TEV frontier from bL 
must cross a threshold before the preferred region is reached.          
 Figure 2, Panel C depicts the situation when the utility curve is exactly tangent to 
the TEV frontier at b.  Given that the intersection is a single point, there is no region in 
which a preferred deviation would be made by a delegated manager incentivized by a 
relative return incentive alone.  This truly is a dire situation for delegated management.  
In this scenario, it would be irrational to delegate portfolio management responsibilities 
to an unconstrained agent because the principal already holds the best possible portfolio 
given the delegated performance incentive.  This situation is most comparable to the 
situation analyzed in Admati and Pfleiderer (1997).  They find, among other things, that 
when a delegated manager is incentivized by a relative performance incentive, given an 
efficiently allocated benchmark, there is no possibility for utility improvement through 
delegation.  This would indicate that the principal should choose not to delegate.  
However, in the Roll (1992) framework, which I am using in this essay, there is a way to 
constrain the external manager to necessarily improve utility even in this dire situation.  
This involves the beta constraint proposed by Roll and it is applicable to all three cases 
presented thus far.  The beta constraint is analyzed in this paper in sections V and VI.   
 Figure 2, Panel D is the case when the benchmark portfolio, b, lies below the 
minimum variance portfolio and equivalently also below the minimum point on the TEV 
frontier.  This is a special case of Case A.  The reason it is special is because no matter 
the slope of the utility curve at b, deviations up from b along the TEV frontier always 
increase utility.  As favorable as this situation seems, at least anecdotally, I consider this 
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situation highly unlikely but not impossible.  In order for this to occur, however, there 
would have to be massive inefficiency in the investment set available to the principal.  
Thus, although this case is intellectually curious, it is probably also practically 
impossible.   
 As depicted in Figure 2, it is highly likely that given the interaction between the 
principal’s utility curve and the TEV frontier, that benchmarking and the implied relative 
return incentives could potentially create a utility increase for the principal.  However, 
care must be taken in this relationship to ensure that the agent does not take too much risk 
as to exceed the region in which a preferred portfolio could be chosen.  Thus at this point 
the framework is set to analyze the proposed constraints on external managers.  How can 
we force the external manager to buy a portfolio within the preferred region?   
 
IV.  Constraining the Agent’s Risk Appetite using a TEV Constraint 
To control the behavior of external managers, other papers have assumed a direct 
constraint on agent risk aversion, such as Bertrand (2010).  However, risk aversion is the 
parameter that defines the behavior of the individual and trying to forcibly constrain (or 
extend) an agent’s risk level is akin to trying to constrain a law of nature.  A principal 
could filter potential delegated managers based on his perceived notion of the agent’s risk 
aversion but implicit in this filtering is a situation that creates more uncertainty, i.e. more 
risk, due to the potential for asymmetric information.  Additionally, there is no good way 
to either ex-ante or ex-post measure an agent’s risk aversion level.  It can be proxied ex-
post but would require a substantial amount of data.  Practically however, if it could be 
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done, constraining on agent risk aversion would peg the external manager to the optimal 
point for the principal along the TEV frontier.  Constraining risk aversion would only 
allow the delegated manager to move so far up the frontier until the point where the 
principal’s utility is optimized.  But, why use the something so elusive when a 
conventional measure exists that is more tangible, measurable, and serves the same 
purpose: tracking error volatility. 
Jorion (2003) considers the problem of maximizing (and minimizing) return given 
a tracking error constraint in mean-variance space.  Equivalently we could minimize (and 
maximize) standard deviation or variance given a tracking error constraint.  If the 
problem is set up in this fashion, on variance, it looks like the following: 
 min
𝐰𝐰
𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰   𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1  𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 (𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) = 𝑇𝑇2 (28) 
And the Lagrangian can be set up like this: 
 L(𝐰𝐰,𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟 , 𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇2)= 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 − 𝜆𝜆1(𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 − 1) − 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟(𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝑟𝑟)
− 𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇2((𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) − 𝑇𝑇2) 
 
(29) 
Differentiating yields the following set of simultaneous equations. 
 2𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰− 𝜆𝜆1𝟏𝟏 − 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝐫𝐫 − 𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇2(2𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰− 2𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛) = 𝟎𝟎 
𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 
𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟 (𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) = 𝑇𝑇2 
 
(30) 
Solving this system for w yields the following weight vector: 
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𝐰𝐰 = 𝐛𝐛 + �𝜆𝜆1𝟏𝟏 + 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝐫𝐫 − 2𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇2𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛2(1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇2) � (31) 
And applying this weight vector to the variance calculation yields the following ellipse in 
mean-variance space.  Jorion calls this the constant TEV frontier. 
 
 �𝜎𝜎
2 − 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2 − 𝑇𝑇2
𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏
�
′
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 −
(𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)2
𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
−2�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏�
−2�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏� 4 �𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 − 1𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏� ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
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�
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�
𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 −
(𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)2
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−2�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏� 4 �𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 − 1𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏� �� = 0 
 
 
(32) 
The notation |…| is the determinant of the matrix.  This ellipse is illustrated in Figure 3, 
Panel A.  Note that this is an ellipse in mean and variance and this figure is in mean and 
standard deviation, so the ellipse is slightly distorted.  This ellipse grows and shrinks as 
the constant, T 2, is increased and decreased.  However, since this is an ellipse, it is only 
defined over a limited region in r.  As Jorion (2003) shows, this ellipse reaches its 
maximum and minimum values in return along the TEV frontier at the following levels, 
given a fixed T:   
 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 ± 𝑇𝑇��𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 �  (33) 
This expression is actually equivalent to equation (13) from Section II of this essay, the 
TEV frontier in mean and tracking error volatility.  Equation (13) is just solved for the 
return.  The constant TEV frontier is graphed with the TEV frontier in relative space in 
Figure 3, Panel B.  The constant TEV frontier is just a vertical line connecting the top of  
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Figure 3
Constraining the Agent’s Risk Appetite using a Tracking Error Constraint
Panel A: Mean-Variance Space
Panel B: Mean-TEV Space
This figure shows that constraining an agent on tracking error causes the agent to chose a 
portfolio further down the TEV frontier.  This decreases agent utility but has the potential to 
increase principal utility.  Depicted in this figure are an arbitrary constraint of T=8% and the 
principal's optimal constraint of about 4.3%.  Note that the principal's utility curve is tangent to the 
TEV frontier at the optimal tracking error constraint.
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the curve to bottom of the curve and it should be evident from this figure that the 
maximum and minimum must be reached along the frontier.   
The expression with the radical from (33) is the slope of the line extending from 
the intercept and is also the maximum possible information ratio given the return vector 
and the covariance matrix.  This is an important constant and it even appeared in equation 
(20) from this essay.  Many other authors, stemming from Merton (1972), define this 
constant by giving it a name (usually d).  The equivalence between constraining in 
tracking error volatility and agent risk aversion is also evident in equation (33)’s 
similarity to equation (19), the external manager’s optimal choice given a level of risk 
aversion.  If we take the transpose of equation (19) and multiply it by the return vector, 
we get the following: 
 
𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝐛𝐛′𝐫𝐫 + 12𝜃𝜃 �𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫� 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 + 12𝜃𝜃 �𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)2𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 � 
(34) 
 
(35) 
And, by setting equation (35) equal to equation (33), equivalence between the agent’s 
quadratic utility risk aversion coefficient, θ, and the tracking error volatility, T, can be 
obtained: 
 
𝑇𝑇 = 12𝜃𝜃��𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 �  (36) 
This shows that constraining on tracking error is a practical way of constraining 
delegated managers to act as if their risk aversion had been constrained.  The constraint 
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does not change the agent’s level of risk aversion.  It merely forces the external manager 
to buy a portfolio as if he had a higher level of risk aversion. 
What is obvious when considering the utility maximization problem of the agent, 
equation (16), is that if tracking error is constrained to be fixed, then the agent’s utility 
maximization problem just becomes a return maximization problem: maximize r given a 
fixed T.   
 max
𝐰𝐰
 𝑈𝑈 =  max
𝐰𝐰
 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) ,
𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 (𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) = 𝑇𝑇2 
(37) 
Solving this problem will yield the following weight vector but equation (36) could also 
be substituted into equation (19) to arrive at the same result: 
 
𝐰𝐰 = 𝑇𝑇 �𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐
𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
�
−𝟏𝟏 𝟐𝟐⁄
𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏 �𝐫𝐫 −
𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
𝟏𝟏� + 𝐛𝐛 (38) 
Note that this equation is independent of the agent’s risk aversion parameter.  
Equivalently, the minimization problem for (37) could be solved and it yields a similar 
solution to (38) except that the first term is negative. 
 The return for this weight vector is already given in equation (35) and the tracking 
error is fixed.  This could be verified by plugging the weight vector in (38) into the 
tracking error equation (11).  The combination of this return and tracking error are plotted 
in Figure 3, Panels A and B.  Additionally, the utility curve associated with this portfolio 
is plotted alongside the agent’s maximal utility curve.  This constraint is necessarily 
utility decreasing for the agent.  The opposite is true for the principal however.  Since the 
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principal cares mostly about the variance of this weight vector (38), plugging this into the 
variance equation yields the following: 
 
𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 = 𝑇𝑇2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 + 2𝑇𝑇 �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏��𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 �−𝟏𝟏 𝟐𝟐⁄  (39) 
This is the variance of the portfolio above the benchmark on the TEV frontier as a 
function of tracking error, T.  Similarly, the portfolio below the benchmark on the TEV 
frontier at the same level of tracking error has a variance with a similar equation but with 
one small difference: the third term in (39) is negative.  
 Given that the delegated manager will choose a portfolio on the TEV frontier, a 
principal can maximize his own utility relative to the TEV frontier by choosing the 
appropriate tracking error bound to apply to an external manager.  Since the return and 
standard deviation can be parameterized in T, then we simply maximize the principal’s 
utility function (21) with respect to T by substituting in equations (33) and (39) for the 
return and variance. 
 max
𝑇𝑇
 𝑈𝑈 =  max
𝑇𝑇
 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 
= max
𝑇𝑇
 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 + 𝑇𝑇 �𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 �𝟏𝟏 𝟐𝟐⁄
− 𝜃𝜃 �𝑇𝑇2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2
+ 2𝑇𝑇 �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏��𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 �−𝟏𝟏 𝟐𝟐⁄ �  
 
 
(40) 
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And the solution is: 
 
𝑇𝑇 = 12𝜃𝜃 �𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 �𝟏𝟏 𝟐𝟐⁄
− �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 −
𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
��𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 −
(𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐
𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
�
−𝟏𝟏 𝟐𝟐⁄
 
(41) 
This is the tracking error bound a principal with quadratic utility should choose to force 
the delegated manager to buy a portfolio that maximizes the principal’s utility subject to 
the constraint of the TEV frontier.  If this bound is chosen, and the agent abides by the 
constraint, then as is depicted in Figure 3, Panel A, the principal’s utility curve associated 
with this constraint is tangent to the TEV frontier at the intersection of the frontier with 
the constant TEV ellipse.  This level of utility is preferred to the one associated with 
holding the benchmark albeit still less preferred than the one associated with the 
principal’s global optimization problem. 
 Table 2 calculates the quadratic utility deviations for the principal under differing 
scenarios of agent and principal risk aversion.  Panel A depicts the utility increase or 
decrease for the principal from a fixed tracking error constraint of 8%.  The delegated 
performance incentive with a tracking error constraint has the potential to increase utility 
for the principal if the constraint is chosen appropriately.  Given the levels of utility I use 
in the figures for this paper, the utility increases by 0.20% through delegation with an 8% 
constraint.  Panel B shows the utility increase from the benchmark given an optimal 
tracking error constraint; this is necessarily non-negative.  Also depicted is that the level 
of utility increase is independent of agent risk aversion.  Essentially, values down each  
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column is identical.  Recall that the tracking error constraint substitutes for the agent’s 
risk aversion level. 
 
V.  Constraining Benchmark Relative Beta  
In addition to the tracking error constraint, another pervasive constraint applied in 
the modern investment industry is the benchmark relative beta constraint.  The colloquial 
way to consider a beta constraint is to put a limitation on “style drift” but the beta 
constraint is about much more than just the technical definition of style drift.  Most 
delegated investment management is done in two stages: a strategic allocation stage, 
where the asset class weights (the beta or factor sensitivities) are set, then the tactical 
asset allocation is made to improve performance over each factor.  When hiring an 
external manager to manage all or part of an allocation to a particular asset class, the 
principal is mostly concerned with whether the agent manages the factor sensitivity 
appropriately.  If an agent creates factor sensitivity different than β = 1 against the 
benchmark, this hurts the optimality of the strategic allocation either by altering the 
agent’s mandated factor sensitivity and therefore the effective weight of that allocation in 
the overall portfolio, or though the agent cannibalizing factor sensitivity from a different 
delegated manager.  However, even in the case of a single delegated manager, the beta 
constraint seems justified.  Agents are being hired to use their skill to the benefit of the 
principal.  As per our assumptions, the principal already has the skill to buy and therefore 
lever the factor sensitivity of the benchmark, at least downward.  Thus some form of beta 
constraint seems rational when trying to control delegated managers. 
90 
 
Many external managers will argue that the beta constraint limits their ability to 
generate returns for the principal.  And, just like the tracking error constraint, the beta 
constraint necessarily reduces the utility of the agent but has the potential to increase 
utility for the principal.  Roll (1992) analyzes the beta constraint and shows that when the 
benchmark is above the minimum variance portfolio in return the beta constrained TEV 
frontier is superior to the unconstrained TEV frontier for some finite region above the 
benchmark portfolio.  We can set up the minimization problem as follows.    
 min
𝐰𝐰
(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)′𝛀𝛀(𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛)   𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 = 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 (42) 
This problem is actually set up with a constraint to covariance, w′Ωb, rather than beta but 
since the variance of the relative benchmark is a constant, constraining on beta and 
constraining on covariance are equivalent.  Also, it should be noted that under the 
constraint on beta, or covariance, the minimization problem on tracking error and the 
minimization problem on variance are also equivalent since the tracking error is now a 
function of the variance of the portfolio and two constants, covariance and the variance of 
the benchmark.  Thus the following problem could be solved for w and an identical 
solution would be obtained.  
 min
𝐰𝐰
𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰   𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 = 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 (43) 
Unlike the situation with unconstrained TEV optimization, under the condition of a beta 
constraint, the delegated manager and the principal are, at least, now optimizing against 
the same curve.  Below is the Lagrangian based on equation (43) 
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 L�𝐰𝐰,  𝜆𝜆1,  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟 ,  𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽�= 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 −  𝜆𝜆1 (𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 − 1)  −  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟 (𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝑟𝑟)
−  𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽(𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 − 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2) 
(44) 
Differentiating yields the following system of equations: 
 2𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 −  𝜆𝜆1𝟏𝟏 −  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝐫𝐫 −  𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 = 𝟎𝟎 
𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 
𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 𝑟𝑟 
𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 = 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 
 
(45) 
Solving this system yields the following weight vector: 
 
𝐰𝐰 =  𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛] �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
� 
(46) 
And the equation for the parabola in mean-variance space is derived by plugging the 
weight vector from (46) into the variance equation as follows.  This curve is depicted in 
Figure 4, Panel A for the cases β = 1, β >1, and β < 1.   
 
𝜎𝜎2 = 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 = � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
�
′
�[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
� 
(47) 
The equation for the curve in relative mean-tracking error space can be computed 
by first differencing the weight vector in (46) with b: 
 (𝐰𝐰− 𝐛𝐛) =  𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛] �[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
� − 𝐛𝐛 
(48) 
Next, the differenced vector in equation (48) can be plugged into the tracking error 
variance equation to yield the following: 
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𝑇𝑇2 = � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
�
′
�[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
� + 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2
− 2 � 1𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏
𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
�
′
�[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
�
= � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
�
′
�[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏[𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−𝟏𝟏 � 1𝑟𝑟
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2
�
+ (1 − 2𝛽𝛽)𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 
 
 
 
(49) 
This curve is depicted in Figure 4, Panel B also for three cases, β = 1, β >1, and β < 1.  
Note that these curves are all at best as good at the TEV frontier in preference and a 
principal requiring a beta constraint will most likely require the agent to suffer a utility 
deterioration.  The weight vector the external manager will choose can be derived by 
maximizing his utility function however this time with the addition of a beta constraint.   
Just as with the derivation of the beta constrained TEV frontier, maximizing the 
agent’s utility function parameterized in tracking error and maximizing the principal’s 
utility function parameterized in variance yields the same choice vector, given the same 
value for θ, because the beta, or covariance, constraint makes w′Ωw the only free variable 
in the risk calculation.  However, there is no reason why the risk aversion parameter 
would be the same so it is still likely an agent and a principal would choose a different 
portfolio.  Below is the utility to be optimized, parameterized in variance. 
 max
𝐰𝐰
 𝑈𝑈 =  max
𝐰𝐰
 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰   𝑎𝑎. 𝑡𝑡.  𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 = 1 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 = 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 L�𝐰𝐰, 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽� = 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 − 𝜃𝜃𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐰𝐰 −  𝜆𝜆1 (𝐰𝐰′𝟏𝟏 − 1) − 𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽(𝐰𝐰′𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 − 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2) 
(50) 
(51) 
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Figure 4
Constraining Benchmark Relative Beta 
Panel A: Mean-Variance Space
Panel B: Mean-TEV Space
This figure demonstrates how the agent's portfolio choice changes with the benchmark relative 
beta constraint.  In general, the agent's utility is increasing in beta.  However, there is an optimal 
beta constraint for the principal.  This constraint is depicted as the β < 1 curve.  Not coincidently, 
this is the beta of the principal's global optimal portfolio.
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Differentiating the Lagrangian, finding the critical value and solving for w yields the 
following vector: 
 
𝐰𝐰 = 12𝜃𝜃 𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏 �𝐫𝐫
− [𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−1 �[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1𝐫𝐫
− 2𝜃𝜃 � 1𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2��� 
(52) 
This is the weight vector for the portfolio that the principal and the agent would choose 
given a risk aversion level of θ and a beta constraint of β. 
 The idea of the principal choosing an optimal beta constraint is slightly more 
ambiguous than the principal’s choice of a tracking error constraint.  The tracking error 
problem eliminated the need to estimate the agent’s risk aversion, but the risk aversion 
level is still a prominent parameter in the beta constrained TEV frontier as is evident in 
equation (47).  The delegated manager’s weight vector in (52) could be used in the 
portfolio variance and return functions, plugged into the principal’s utility function, and 
that function could be solved for the critical value on beta to arrive at the optimal beta.  
But, there is an easier way to discover this value by inspection.  Recognize that since the 
optimization happens on the same curve in absolute and relative space, if the principal 
and agent have the same value for their individual risk aversion constants, the principal 
could constrain the agent based on the beta of the global optimal portfolio and the agent 
would buy the global optimal portfolio.  However, it is more likely that their risk aversion 
levels differ.  But, this is not a concern.  When you plug the weight vector from (52) into 
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the principal’s utility function and differentiate on beta, the agent’s risk aversion 
constants cancel in the only remaining terms.  Thus, the optimal beta constraint is 
independent of the agent’s risk aversion level.  And, since we already discovered it given 
equal risk aversion levels, it must be equal to this value, the beta of the global optimal 
portfolio.  Therefore, to obtain the optimal beta constraint, all one needs is to go back to 
the portfolio choice made in the principal’s utility given the principal’s risk aversion level 
of θ, and calculate the beta of the optimal choice portfolio.  Beta is calculated as follows: 
 
𝛽𝛽 = 1
𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏
2 𝐰𝐰
′𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛 
(53) 
Thus, we simply plug-in the weight vector from equation (24) and the optimal beta is 
calculated: 
 
𝛽𝛽 = 12𝜃𝜃𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 �𝐫𝐫′𝐛𝐛 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 2𝜃𝜃𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝟏𝟏′𝐛𝐛� = 12𝜃𝜃𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 2𝜃𝜃𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 � (54) 
This result could be verified by going through the standard process of maximizing a 
utility function described in the last paragraph.  This optimal beta constrained TEV curve 
is depicted in Figure 4, Panels A and B and in this case is represented by the curve where 
β < 1.  As is evident from the figure, the iso-utility curves are plotted for an agent with a 
higher risk appetite than the principal.  The agent’s utility curve under a beta constraint is 
always below his optimal utility curve and therefore this is a utility decrease for the 
agent.  However, as depicted in the figure, this constraint could be a possible utility 
increase for the principal. 
 Table 3 calculates the quadratic utility deviations for the principal under differing 
scenarios.  Panel A depicts the utility increase or decrease for the principal from a fixed  
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Beta constraint of 1.  The delegated performance incentive with a beta constraint has the 
potential to increase utility for the principal if the constraint is chosen appropriately.  
Given the levels of utility I use in the figures for this paper, the utility increases by 1.90% 
through delegation and a beta of 1.  Although utility increase is relatively certain, if the 
agent’s risk aversion level is low enough, he can still destroy utility under a beta 
constraint.  Panel B shows the utility increase from the benchmark given an optimal beta 
constraint; this is necessarily better than Panel A.  Essentially, cell my cell the utility 
level is higher in Panel B than in Panel A.  Note that just like Panel A, the level of utility 
increase is substantial and relatively certain under reasonable levels of risk aversion, but 
still not guaranteed. 
 
VI.  Maximizing Principal Utility by Constraining TEV and Beta 
In section IV, I discussed controlling the level of risk an external manager takes 
by using a tracking error constraint, similar to Jorion (2003).  This constrains the 
delegated manager to purchase a portfolio that optimizes principal utility despite the 
agent’s actual level of risk aversion.  In section V, I discussed using a beta constraint to 
encourage the external manager to invest on a frontier superior (at least for some finite 
region) to the TEV frontier, similar to Roll (1992).  Both of these constraints have the 
ability to increase the principal’s utility and have the unfortunate downside of decreasing 
agent utility.  The combination of these two constraints should allow the principal to 
potentially increase utility to a greater extent than either constraint can accomplish alone.  
The inclusion of both a beta and tracking error constraint limits the set of possible 
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portfolios to either 2, 1, or 0 real solutions in both mean-variance and mean-TEV space.  
The evidence that there are at most 2 solutions to these intersections is more technically 
understood from an analysis of equation (49).  This is an equation parameterized in T, β, 
and r.  T and β are constrained to be fixed, and since the equation is quadratic in r, it has a 
maximum of 2 solutions. 
Since the values for T and β are derived from the same data, there are 
combinations of these calculations that are not feasible in a real sense based on the return 
vector and the covariance matrix, thus the option of zero solutions is a definite 
possibility.  Also as was discussed in the analysis of the agent’s portfolio choice along the 
TEV frontier, if there are two solutions to the optimization problem, one of the solutions 
always dominates the other solution in the agent’s portfolio choice based on his utility 
function.  Thus the proper use of a beta and TEV constraint, as long as the combination is 
consistent, could direct the external manager to buy any portfolio underneath the 
envelope of the efficient frontier.  “Any portfolio” obviously includes the principal’s 
global optimal portfolio.  Therefore, a principal would calculate the optimal constraints 
by maximizing his global utility function, unconstrained, then merely calculate the beta 
and tracking error of this portfolio and provide those constraints to the agent.  Again, this 
would force the agent to buy the principal’s global optimal portfolio. 
The optimal beta constraint was calculated in the previous section and recall that 
this constraint is not dependent on the risk aversion level of the agent.  Thus, the optimal 
beta constraint is always as is given in equation (54).  Additionally, the tracking error 
constraint requirement made the agent’s risk aversion irrelevant.  However, just as with 
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controlling agent risk level along the TEV frontier by increasing and decreasing tracking 
error, the principal controls the agent’s risk level along the beta constrained frontier with 
a tracking error constraint.  As the tracking error constraint is increased, the agent moves 
further and further up the constrained beta frontier until the point where the constraint is 
reached, at the optimal portfolio.  The tracking error variance of the global optimal 
portfolio can be calculated by using the weight vector of the principal’s optimal portfolio 
choice from equation (24) and substituting it into the definition of tracking error variance: 
 
𝑇𝑇2 = 12𝜃𝜃 �𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝐫𝐫 − 2�𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 2𝜃𝜃𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 � 𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 + (𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 2𝜃𝜃)𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 � + 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2
−
1
𝜃𝜃
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 −
𝐫𝐫′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 2𝜃𝜃
𝟏𝟏′𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
� 
 
(55) 
 
This is the tracking error of the principal’s global optimal portfolio given an optimization 
on the agent’s information.  In this context, the tracking error constraint is definitely a 
function of the principal’s risk aversion coefficient.  
 In Figure 5, Panel A and B the curves of the mean-variance frontier, the constant 
TEV ellipse, and the constant beta frontier are graphed for various scenarios.  
Additionally, the global maximum portfolio is identified and the associated iso-utility 
curves are drawn; the principal’s utility is depicted in Panel A and the agent’s utility is 
depicted in Panel B.  It is evident in the figure that the constant beta frontier can cross the 
constant TEV ellipse in at most 2 places and also that it is possible for the curves to have 
no real intersections, indicating a set of inconsistent constraints.  The constant beta 
frontier is also tangent to the mean-variance frontier at exactly one point.  If the tracking 
error and beta constraints are as was defined above, then the curves of the efficient  
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Figure 5
Maximizing Principal Utility by Constraining Both the Tracking Error and Beta
Panel A: Mean-Variance Space
Panel B: Mean-TEV Space
This figure shows various levels of beta and tracking error constrained frontiers along with the 
principal's optimal constraints.  Given the optimal constraints, the agent will choose the principal's 
global optimal portfolio.  It is evident from the figure that the agent's utility is sub-optimal but that 
the principal's utility is maximized.  The optimally constrained beta and tracking error curves and 
the efficient frontier are all tangent to the principal's utility curve at the agent's choice portfolio.
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frontier, the constant beta frontier, and the constant TEV ellipse are exactly tangent at one 
point, the global mean-variance optimal portfolio.  Thus the intersection of these curves 
reflects that the constraints incentivize the delegated manager to buy the principal’s 
global optimal portfolio.  
 However, the constraints associated with the global maximum portfolio may be 
too loose.  For example, in the dataset used to build the figures in this paper, the beta 
constraint of the global optimal portfolio is about 0.68 and the tracking error volatility 
constraint is about 10%.  These constraints seem rather ridiculous to give an external 
manager in the context of delegated management.  In particular, the concern with a loose 
tracking error constraint is whether it is even possible to generate that type of tracking 
error versus a benchmark without buying another uncorrelated systematic risk.  This 
theory implies that all of the differentiation is done with the delegated manager’s 
uncorrelated alpha generating process.  Which leads to the second concern: if you 
benchmark a manager and give him a beta constraint of 0.6, what does the manager do 
with the other 0.4?  If the external manager’s uncorrelated, idiosyncratic strategy, their 
alpha strategy, takes factor exposure to any asset class other than the mandated asset 
class, then that creates inefficiency in in the principal’s overall portfolio. 
 That however is only the first concern.  It is not only probable but highly likely 
that it is not possible for the principal to identify his global optimal portfolio much less 
calculate the tracking error variance and beta of the portfolio.  This is particularly true 
considering the set of information he would need to optimize over is the agent’s set of 
information, information for which he would be hiring the delegated manager because the 
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principal does not know this information.  As other authors have suggested, using general 
bounds for these two constraints is probably more realistic.  Roll (1992) emphasizes the 
beta constraint of β = 1.  This constraint has the benefit of a guaranteed utility increase no 
matter the slope of the principal’s utility and is also consistent with the idea of preventing 
style drift.  The tracking error constraint can be imposed to move up the beta constrained 
frontier.  Below I calculate the optimal tracking error constraint given a beta constraint of 
1; however, it is likely that a moderate tracking error constraint would also be good 
enough.  Not coincidently, these two constraints, with reasonable values, are exactly the 
way principals control delegated managers in the investment industry.   
 Thus, the problem is to optimize principal utility by choosing tracking error given 
the constraint of β = 1.  We could parameterize the principal’s utility as a function of 
tracking error.  Similar to the problem of optimizing agent utility given a tracking error 
constraint, under the conditions of a fixed tracking error and a fixed beta, optimizing 
either agent or principal utility is now just a return maximization problem.  The 
relationship between tracking error and variance is a simple one, particularly with β = 1.  
The expression is just as follows: 
 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝑇𝑇2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 (56) 
Calculating the level of return associated with the two constraints is a rather complicated 
expression but could be done by solving equation (49) for r.  It could also be done by 
using equation (52) above, setting beta equal to zero and using the principal’s risk 
aversion instead of the agent’s risk aversion. 
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𝐰𝐰 = 12𝜃𝜃 𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏 �𝐫𝐫
− [𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−1 �[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1𝐫𝐫
− 2𝜃𝜃 � 1𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2��� 
(57) 
Plugging this weight vector into the return function yields the following: 
 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝐰𝐰′𝐫𝐫 = 12𝜃𝜃 �𝐫𝐫
− [𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−1 �[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1𝐫𝐫
− 2𝜃𝜃 � 1𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2���′ 𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏𝒓𝒓 
(58) 
And the optimal constraint to T is chosen by applying that weight vector to the tracking 
error function: 
 
𝑇𝑇2 = 1(2𝜃𝜃)2 �𝐫𝐫 − [𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−1 �[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1𝐫𝐫
− 2𝜃𝜃 � 1𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2���′ 𝛀𝛀−𝟏𝟏 �𝐫𝐫
− [𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]�−1 �[𝟏𝟏 𝛀𝛀𝐛𝐛]′𝛀𝛀−1𝐫𝐫
− 2𝜃𝜃 � 1𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2��� 
(59) 
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This is the optimal constraint to T given a beta of 1 and the agent’s optimization process 
in relative space. 
 Just for reference, the numerical value of this point in my figures is about 9%.  
Realistically, this may also be a particularly loose tracking error constraint.  Even if a 
constraint is lower than where the optimal point is chosen, this is still guaranteed to be a 
utility increase for the principal since any deviation from the benchmark below the 
optimal point and above the benchmark must be a utility increase.  Jorion (2003) agrees 
with the idea of a general tracking error constraint.  His analysis brings up the point of 
using a tracking error bound to not extend variance too far and I am emphasizing that the 
bound should be set to maximize utility.  But, those two goals consistent with each other 
once the optimal tracking error bound is reached. 
 The constraints described above are depicted in Figure 6, Panels A and B.  It is 
evident from the figure that the constrained beta frontier when β = 1 passes thought the 
benchmark at its minimum point.  The frontier is superior to the TEV frontier over a good 
portion of its region, and the curve is tangent to the efficient frontier at a point well up the 
curve from the global efficient portfolio.  Increasing constant TEV ellipses eventually at 
the point of the optimally constrained portfolio are depicted.  The principal’s iso-utility 
curves are included in Panel A at the level of the benchmark, the optimally constrained 
portfolio, and the global optimal portfolio.  Utility at the optimally constrained portfolio 
has increased from the benchmark and the utility curve is tangent to the constrained beta 
frontier at this point.  Additionally, the optimal TEV ellipse passes through the chosen 
portfolio at this point.  The utility of this portfolio is obviously less than the utility of the  
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Figure 6
Maximizing Principal Utility by Choosing Tracking Error given a Beta Constraint of 1
Panel A: Mean-Variance Space
Panel B: Mean-TEV Space
In this figure, the principal uses a fixed beta constraint of 1 and chooses a tracking error to 
maximize his utility given the agent's portfolio choice.  The constrained TEV ellipse passes through 
the point at which the principal's utility is tangent to the constrained beta curve.  Also depicted are 
the agent's unconstrained choice and the principal's global optimal portfolios.
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global optimal but recall that it is unlikely that the principal knows the location of this 
portfolio anyway.  The agent’s utility curves are drawn in Panel B along with the 
optimization curves and it is apparent that utility in this space decreases for the agent. 
 
VII  Conclusion 
 This paper revisits the problem of Roll (1992) where a delegated investment 
manager optimizes over tracking error volatility rather than standard deviation.  In 
comparison to mean-variance optimization, TEV optimization creates a frontier that is 
inferior to the efficient frontier.  I show how this directly implies that the agent is 
optimizing over a utility function that is parameterized in tracking error volatility rather 
than in variance.  This framework is a prominent feature of modern investment 
management and arises through both a direct and an indirect performance incentive.  This 
performance incentive has been studied by many other authors and they arrive at various 
conclusions, mostly implying that relative optimization over tracking error is inefficient.  
Therefore delegated management, because of this inefficiency, is likely to be inferior for 
a principal even if the delegated manager has more skill and information. 
 However, I show that the principal’s preference is really dependent upon the 
interaction of the TEV frontier and the principal’s utility function.  Except for a very 
unlikely case, the case where the benchmark is perfectly optimal over the agent’s 
information, substantial utility improvements exist for the principal if the delegated agent 
is properly controlled.  Given industry anecdotes related to tracking error constraints and 
beta constraints, I reanalyze the tracking error constraint from Jorion (2003) and the beta 
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constraint from Roll (1992) in the context of a principal’s utility function to show that 
there are levels of these constraints that likely increase utility for the principal. 
 In isolation, the tracking error constraint is used to limit the level of standard 
deviation an unconstrained delegated manager would likely take.  Without the tracking 
error constraint, an agent could buy a portfolio so far up the TEV frontier that it actually 
decreases the principal’s utility therefore making the delegation a bad idea.  By imposing 
this constraint, the principal could ensure that the agent buy a portfolio within the region 
that increases utility.  If “good enough” information is available to the principal, I show 
how the principal could optimize the level of the tracking error constraint (given 
quadratic utility) thus, by imposing this optimal TEV constraint, could maximize his 
utility given the delegated performance incentive.  This level of utility is necessarily a 
utility increase except for the special case mentioned above.  I also show how the TEV 
constraint is effectively just a risk aversion constraint.  So, rather than trying to constrain 
or filter delegated managers directly on their level of risk aversion, tracking error allows 
principals to force managers to invest as if their risk aversion level was known to the 
principal.  The agent’s actual level of risk aversion is an unnecessary element of how to 
set the tracking error constraint.  Only the principal’s risk aversion level matters. 
Additionally, as Roll (1992) shows, the beta constrained TEV frontier is superior 
to the unconstrained TEV frontier and therefore is also a guaranteed utility increase for 
the principal as long as the beta constraint is set appropriately.  A beta constraint of 1 
always has a positive utility deviation for the principal.  Just as an optimal tracking error 
can be calculated, there is an optimal beta constraint that can be used to maximize the 
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principal’s utility.  Perhaps surprisingly, this beta constraint is constant despite the level 
of risk aversion of agent and is, once again, only dependent on the level of the principal’s 
risk aversion.  It happens to be equal to the beta of the principal’s global optimal 
portfolio, the portfolio optimized in principal utility over the agent’s information.  
Choosing this beta constraint is necessarily a utility increase for the principal and thus 
makes a beta constrained portfolio, in the context of delegated portfolio management a 
good idea. 
Given that these two constraints both work well in isolation, it is likely that a 
combination of these constraints lead to an even better portfolio.  Additionally, because 
of the intersection of the beta constrained frontier with the constant TEV ellipse, and the 
agent’s utility function, these two constraints can be used to pin a delegated manager to 
exactly one point underneath the envelope of the efficient frontier.  Since this includes 
the principal’s global optimal portfolio, setting the tracking error constraint and the beta 
constraint, which is just the same as the optimal beta constraint in isolation, to the levels 
of the global optimal portfolio forces the delegated manager to buy the optimal portfolio.  
However, since it is unlikely that a principal has the information to make this calculation, 
setting the constraints to reasonable levels are also likely to generate a utility increase for 
the principal.  Following Roll and Jorion, who both suggest considering reasonable levels 
for these constraints rather than a rigorous calculation, I assume that the beta constraint is 
set to one, the case with an unambiguous utility increase.  Under this assumption, I 
calculate the optimal tracking error constraint but it should be noted that any reasonable 
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tracking error constraint under this scenario is almost certainly a utility increase for the 
principal.   
Overall, delegated portfolio management is less efficient that doing it yourself.  
However, the reality of asymmetric information and differences in skill necessitate the 
delegation of a good portion of the assets that are managed in the modern investment 
industry.  Even given the inefficiency of delegated management, it is still possible to 
create utility increases for the principal if constraints are properly imposed.  In fact, under 
the scenario built in this essay, it is even possible to constrain the agent to act in a manner 
identical to that which the principal would act given exactly the same information and 
skill level.  This work is supportive of the idea of delegated portfolio management and 
shows clearly that it can be an efficient and rational exercise if the delegated managers 
are properly controlled and not left to maximize their own (agent) utility at the expense of 
the principal.  
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Table A1
Numerical Values Used to Build the Figures and Tables
r b
0.06 0 0.01114 0.00639 0.00522 0.00127
0.10 1 0.00639 0.01836 0.00948 0.00843
0.13 0 0.00522 0.00948 0.01779 0.00676
0.04 0 0.00127 0.00843 0.00676 0.01245
Ω
Every figure and calculation done in this paper were built with these three matrices.  I tried to be a 
pure as I could in the expressions without redefining variables, as much as possible.  These values 
were chosen somewhat arbitrarily for ease of depiction and exposition.  The final examples are mildly 
representative of a realistic scenario but not actually done with real calculations.
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